On April 2003, 15, US soldiers toppled a sculpture of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Today, XNUMX years later, we know: the war claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, plunged the Middle East into chaos, and – it was based on lies.
Almost three weeks had to pass since the start of the US-led invasion of Iraq, so that millions of viewers in front of small screens could watch the demolition of the Saddam Hussein sculpture in Baghdad. That picture from April 9, 2003 entered the collective memory of humanity. But even today, 15 years later, many questions are still open. For example, it is not clear how many Iraqis died during the war in Iraq and in the chaos that followed.
Estimates range between 150.000 and half a million dead. Some serious research even reaches significantly higher figures. In 2006, the prestigious medical journal "Lancet" calculated that there were more than 650.000 "subsequent deaths". In addition to violent deaths, the research also included the consequences of the infrastructure destroyed by the bombings and thus also the destroyed health institutions.
However, what is known for sure is the following: the justifications for that war were based on lies. There is another image about the war in Iraq that is also part of the collective memory, and that is the image during the speech of US Secretary of State Colin Powell before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003.
Six weeks before the start of the war, Powell, in a speech that lasted 76 minutes, prepared the world public for war. The gist of that speech was as follows: Saddam Hussein possesses biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, his regime supports international terrorism, and he intends to acquire nuclear weapons.
"Mobile Chemical Laboratory"
The highlight of Powell's presentation were the detailed illustrations he used to back up his claims: to avoid the controls of UN weapons inspectors, Iraq converted a convoy of trucks into mobile chemical and biological weapons laboratories. Powell's speech was remembered primarily for one reason: all of these claims turned out to be false. In 2005, Powell himself called his speech a "career embarrassment."
Ray Megavern is a veteran who worked for the CIA for 27 years, among other things in high positions. In 2003, with colleagues from the CIA and other secret services, he founded the association Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS), which criticizes US policy. The 78-year-old assesses for DW: "The intelligence information was not wrong, it was falsified." At the same time, intelligence information - from Germany - played an important role in Powell's presentation.
Code Name "Curveball"
Iraqi chemist Rafed Ahmed Alvan came to Germany as a refugee in 1999 and immediately attracted the attention of the German secret service BND. German intelligence officers interrogated him in the hope of obtaining information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Alvan – codenamed "Curveball" – soon realizes the following: the more information he provides, the better his status becomes. He gets German passports, money, an apartment...
That game lasted until the BND tracked down Alvan's boss, who is tearing down that tower of lies. German intelligence officers informed their American partners about this. And yet, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans began to take an interest in Alvan again.
The daily "Welt" in August 2011, referring to the former head of the BND, August Haning, wrote that the Americans demanded from the Germans in 2001 to declare that the Iraqis' statements were correct. Hanning resisted this and sent a message to CIA chief George Tenet that “so far no third party has provided information similar to that provided by our source; therefore, these findings cannot be considered as confirmed and credible".
Despite further, clear warnings that the veracity of Alvan's statements should be doubted, it was these statements that became a major part of Powell's agitation for war. Ray Megavern is convinced:
"They didn't care if Alvan knew anything about what he was talking about. They had something they could go public with, something they could provide to the creative professionals in the CIA graphics department. And they could then draw the non-existent mobile chemical weapons laboratories, which Powell used in his presentation."
Warnings ignored
The then head of the CIA for Europe, Tyler Drumheller, confirmed in a statement to the British "Guardian" in 2011 that long before 2003, he was warned by a partner from the BND that Alvan's statements were unreliable. He also passed on those warnings to CIA chief George Tenet - but the government of the 43rd US President, George W. Bush, wanted war. The foundations for this were laid much earlier - although it was sold as part of the "war on terror" - says former EU Commissioner for Foreign Policy and before that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in a comment he wrote for "Project Syndicate" from Prague on the occasion of the 15 anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq.
Soon the British allies got involved in the whole story. In May 2005, the newspaper "Sunday Times of London" reported on the contents of a until then top-secret document on the meeting of the British political top on the topic of Iraq held on July 23, 2002. Thus, it came to light that British politicians were well aware at the time that information about Iraq insufficiently confirmed.
The British foreign minister at the time, Jack Straw, stated that the evidence was "thin", that Saddam "does not threaten any of his neighbors", as well as that "his capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction are less than Libya, North Korea or Iran". Those doubts, however, did not prevent the Prime Minister of that time, Tony Blair, from going to war because of his "special ties" with the USA.
Bonus video:
