When Chairman Mao Zedong visited Joseph Stalin in the winter of 1949, he looked very much like a junior subordinate. Stalin let him wait for weeks at his snow-bound dacha No. 2, 27 miles outside Moscow, where the humiliated and embittered Chinese leader complained about everything from the quality of the fish to the uncomfortable mattress.
When the two Communist leaders got down to business, Stalin brokered a bargain whereby Mao was forced to buy Russian weapons and heavy machinery on a loan on which Beijing had to pay interest.
Seven decades later, the power dynamics have changed radically. Shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing for the Winter Olympics to declare "friendship without limits" with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. These days, however, there is no doubt about who is the superpower in that relationship.
China's $18 trillion economy is now ten times more powerful than Russia's. It is Beijing that will dictate the terms of the bailout.
As Russia faces a weakening economy under sanctions and the European oil embargo, China is an obvious potential benefactor for Putin to turn to.
Si shares Putin's animosity towards the West and the NATO alliance, but this does not mean that he will offer alms unconditionally.
Xi's main strategic concern is China's prosperity and security, not saving Russia. Beijing is likely to buy at least some of the oil diverted from Europe, but at a huge discount to world prices.
China will help Russia only to the extent that it does not attract sanctions and jeopardize its own ability to sell goods to rich countries in North America and the EU.
Boundaries in a "no-holds-barred relationship"
Publicly, China strongly demonstrates political solidarity with Moscow. It has increased overall trade with Russia, essentially abandoned Ukraine, expanded financial transactions without the use of dollars or euros, and redoubled future cooperation to develop military technology while conducting joint exercises in the Pacific region.
Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, acknowledged that his country's future lies with China, saying: "Now that the West has assumed a dictatorial position, our economic ties with China will grow even faster."
Also, it seems that Xi himself is a great admirer of Putin on a personal level. Jun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, calls it his "Russian complex." (Since the outbreak of the war, Xi has spoken by phone only with Putin, not with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky.)
However, there are quite serious limits to so-called "no-holds-barred" relationships. At least for now, China is stressing to Western countries that it does not sell weapons or aircraft parts to Russia. Beijing does not want to find itself the target of sanctions, so it has set the boundaries of the relationship. More worryingly for Putin, China has also decided to pay dearly for its support. Beijing, for example, wants to limit Russia's hugely lucrative arms sales to India, China's rival across the Himalayas.
"In a completely different scenario compared to the Cold War, Russia will be a junior partner to a more powerful China. That will irritate Putin," said Matthew Krunig, deputy director of the Skowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Playing second fiddle is not the scenario Putin envisioned when he decided to invade Ukraine in February, driven by a desire to restore his nation's lost glory.
Still, he should have predicted it. China is a country obsessed with correcting historical humiliations and regaining its position as a global leader. The time when the Soviet Union was ideologically - and economically - superior to Communist China is long gone. Huawei is building Russia's 5G networks, while Russia needs Chinese cooperation in everything from aircraft parts to currency exchange. It is also important to point out that not only the USA and Europe impose sanctions on Moscow, but also other large Asian economies: Japan, South Korea and Singapore.
Andrey Kortunov, director general of the Kremlin-based Russian International Affairs Council, doubts that the Russian elite is willing to serve China as a junior partner. However, he does not see many alternatives. "Since the conflict began, Russia needs China more than before because China is in many ways the only one available since economic ties between Russia and the West have been damaged and sanctions have been imposed on Russia."
Oil calculation
Perhaps the biggest question for China is how far it will go to help Putin beat the EU embargo on Russian oil. This European ban will make a big hole in the Russian budget unless other big buyers get involved.
By deciding how much oil to buy, Beijing has enormous leverage over Moscow.
Russia and Saudi Arabia are already China's two largest suppliers of oil. In May, Russian crude oil imports by sea to China reached a two-year high of 1,14 million barrels per day, up from 800 barrels per day in 000, data from Vortexa Analytics showed.
However, this can be explained by a common sense Chinese economic calculation rather than an expression of political solidarity. Due to international sanctions, traders are avoiding Russian crude oil, which is why there is a mini bottleneck, and as a result, Russia is selling oil for 20 to 30 dollars cheaper compared to prices on international exchanges.
Given that China imports over 10 million barrels a day, there is certainly room for it to buy additional volumes, especially as it tries to restart the economy and gradually lift the lockdown measures imposed by the pandemic in key cities like Shanghai.
China will only help Russia to the extent that it does not attract sanctions and jeopardize its own ability to sell goods to rich countries in North America and the EU
However, Russia sold about 2,4 million barrels per day to the EU. Given China's security concerns and resistance to over-dependence on individual suppliers, it is unlikely that China will suddenly start buying all the oil that Russia now has in abundance.
Similarly, China is at an advantage in terms of gas. Shortly before the attack on Ukraine, Putin signed a deal with Xi agreeing to increase natural gas exports to 48 billion cubic meters a year, up from a modest 4,1 billion cubic meters in 2020. Russia is also planning a new gas pipeline, Power of Siberia 2, thanks to for which Russian gas exports would be more easily redirected from Europe to China.
"However, the problem is that even in these negotiations, China holds all the cards in its hands," said Nikos Tsafos, chief energy advisor to the Greek Prime Minister, in May. "As in the case of the first route of the Power of Siberia, China will bargain hard. At this point, it is not known whether China is ready for a deal. Russia is likely to offer very tempting terms - if for no other reason than out of desperation. The question is whether China will accept them. Will they be tempted by the favorable price, or will they think twice about increasing their dependence on Russia at this time?
Disputed export of Russian weapons to India
Russia's need for an ally coincides with China's growing assertiveness. The more isolated Moscow is, the more it will have to help China in its geopolitical ambitions.
For years, Chinese officials have quietly lobbied their Russian counterparts to reduce arms sales to India, which has occasionally had bloody border disputes with Beijing.
Between 2017 and 2022, India was the largest market for Russian arms exports, followed by China, according to data from the Stockholm International Institute. Fighting Indian soldiers armed with Russian equipment may not be fun for China, but it is certainly a lucrative business for Russia.
"Before the war, Russia was very stubborn and claimed that China was not in a position to dictate to whom it would sell weapons. However, I think China will be in that position in five years," said Aleksandar Gabuev, an expert on China-Russia relations at the Carnegie Organization.
As for India, it is trying to maintain an open relationship with Putin. New Delhi, like Beijing, grabs cheap oil, although at the same time it wants to preserve strong relations with the US.
"A Russia weakened by war and sanctions, but not chaotic and unstable, suits China's long-term interests," said Bobo Lo, former deputy head of the Australian mission in Moscow who now works at the Lowy Institute. "Russia's isolation will further push it into the position of a junior partner in that relationship and at the same time increase its economic and strategic dependence on China."
A dominant position
Today's change in the balance of power would seem strange to those who sang the "Internationale" in Moscow in the post-war period. The USSR and the People's Republic had a difficult relationship for decades, despite their supposed ideological closeness.
"During the 1950s, the fact that China was a junior partner was very unpleasant, because the prevailing attitude in Beijing was that Moscow too often cared more about relations with the West at the cost of relations with China," said Joseph Torigian, author of "Prestige, manipulation and coercion" about the relations between Stalin and Mao.
"In the case of Stalin and Mao, Stalin was the teacher, he was the titan of the communist movement. When Stalin passed away, Mao despised Khrushchev as someone who did not understand ideology. When Deng Xiaoping met with Gorbachev, Deng reportedly thought Gorbachev was an idiot.”
Although Xi and Putin have a better personal relationship than their predecessors, they also have different views on the future role of their countries in the world.
Xi has turned all his focus to securing a third presidential term, armed with the story that he will make China - a market deeply intertwined with the West - more prosperous and eventually overtake the US to become the world's largest economy. Sanctions would destroy that plan.
On the other hand, Putin is in a more difficult situation. He will gladly take whatever China offers him given the circumstances his country finds itself in - even if it means Russia is seen as China's weaker partner.
"The problem is that he truly sees the conflict in Ukraine as crucial in the fight for the survival of his regime," Gabuev said. "He is less afraid of being held by China, because the focus is actually on the fight against the USA. If China provides the necessary resources - and at the same time does not interfere in Russia's internal affairs - that is the price he accepts to pay to continue his anti-US."
Translation: N. Bogetić
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