After the United States emerged from the darkness of the Cold War and entered the comfortable glow of the so-called unipolar world, various analysts, experts and world leaders began to predict, bemoan or actively seek a return to a multipolar world. Not surprisingly, Russian and Chinese leaders have long desired a multipolar world, as have leaders of rising powers such as India and Brazil. What is more interesting is that he was also desired by important American allies. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder warned of the "undeniable danger" of American unilateralism, and former French Foreign Minister Iber Vedrin once said that "the entire foreign policy of France... aims to create a world of tomorrow that consists of several poles, not only one". Current French President Emmanuel Macron's support for European unity and strategic autonomy reveals a similar impulse.
Of course, American leaders disagree. They prefer the great opportunities and comfort that come from the status of an irreplaceable power, and are unwilling to give up a position of undisputed dominance. Back in 1991, the George W. Bush administration prepared a defense guidance document calling for active efforts to prevent the emergence of competitors anywhere in the world.
Various national security strategy documents released in subsequent years by both Republicans and Democrats extol the need to maintain American primacy, even as they acknowledge the return of great power competition. Prominent academics also chimed in — some of whom argued that American primacy was “essential to the future of liberty” and good for both the United States and the rest of the world. I myself contributed to that view when I wrote in 2005 that "the central goal of American grand strategy should be to preserve its dominant position for as long as possible." (However, my advice on how to achieve that goal was ignored).
While the Biden administration acknowledges that we have returned to a world of few great powers, it is clearly nostalgic for a brief era when the United States had no equal rivals. Hence the frenetic talk of "American leadership," its desire to inflict a military defeat on Russia that will weaken it so much that it will be unable to cause future problems, and its efforts to curb China's rise by limiting Beijing's access to key technological know-how while simultaneously subsidizing the U.S. semiconductor industry.
Even if these efforts succeed (and there are no guarantees that they will), a return to unipolarity is probably impossible. We will end up under 1: in a bipolar world (with the United States and China as the two poles) or under 2: in a version of unbalanced multipolarity in which the United States is first among a group of unequal but still significant great powers (China, Russia, India, possibly Brazil, and probably rearmed Japan and Germany).
What kind of world would that be? International relations theorists are divided on this issue. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau believed that multipolar systems were less prone to war because states could realign to contain an aggressor and prevent war. For them, the flexibility of realignment is a virtue. Structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer argued the opposite. They believed that bipolar systems were actually more stable because it reduced the possibility of misjudgment; the two major powers know that the other will automatically oppose any serious attempt to change the status quo.
Moreover, the two major powers are not so dependent on the support of allies and can bring their clients into line when necessary. For structural realists, flexibility as a feature of a multipolar order creates greater uncertainty and increases the chances that one revisionist power will think it can change the status quo before the others can join together to prevent it.
If the future world order is based on unbalanced multipolarity and if such orders are more susceptible to wars, then there is cause for concern. However, multipolarity may not be such a bad thing for the United States, provided it is aware of the consequences and adjusts its foreign policy accordingly.
To begin with, let's admit that unipolarity has not been so great for the United States, and especially not for those unfortunate countries that have been the focus of American attention in recent decades. The era of unipolarity included the 11/XNUMX terrorist attacks, two costly and ultimately unsuccessful US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some ill-judged regime changes that resulted in failed states, a financial crisis that dramatically changed US domestic policy, and the emergence of an increasingly ambitious China whose rise was partly made possible by the actions of the United States. However, the United States has not learned much from that experience as it continues to listen to the strategic geniuses whose actions squandered Washington's triumph in the Cold War and hastened the end of unipolarity. The only way to curb the actions of a unipolar power is for it to do it itself, and a crusading state like the United States is not the best at that.
Ideally, a world of unbalanced multipolarity would encourage the United States to move away from its instinctive reliance on hard force and intimidation and to invest more in real diplomacy
The return of multipolarity will create a world in which Eurasia has several great powers of varying strengths. Those countries are likely to view each other with suspicion, especially when they are close to each other.
Such a situation gives the United States considerable flexibility to adjust its alliances when necessary, just as it did when it allied with Stalin's Russia in World War II and thawed relations with Mao's China during the Cold War.
The ability to choose adequate allies is the secret ingredient of America's foreign policy successes in the past: Its position as the only great power in the Western Hemisphere gave it "free security" that no other great power possessed, and made the United States a particularly desirable ally whenever there was serious trouble. As I wrote in the 1980s: “For the middle powers of Europe and Asia, the United States is the perfect ally. Their strength allows their voices to be heard and their actions to be felt... but they are far enough away that they are not a significant threat (to her allies)”.
In a multipolar world, other major powers will gradually assume greater responsibility for their own security, thereby reducing the global burden of the United States. Along with economic growth, India is also strengthening its military forces, and pacifist Japan has promised to double its defense spending by 2027. Of course, this is not entirely good news because regional arms races carry certain risks, and some of these countries may end up acting on a way that is dangerous or provocative.
However, as I have already pointed out, it is not exactly that the United States has been the best at maintaining order in the Middle East, Europe, or even Asia in recent decades. Are we 100 percent convinced that the local powers will be worse, and will it even matter to the Americans?
Although multipolarity has its downsides, efforts to prevent it would be costly and probably futile. Russia may end up suffering a crushing defeat in Ukraine (although this is not at all certain), but because of its size, nuclear arsenal and large natural resources, it will remain in the ranks of the great powers regardless of the outcome of the war.
Export controls and internal challenges may slow China's rise and its relative power may peak in the next decade, but it will remain a major player and its military capabilities will continue to grow.
Japan is still the third largest economy in the world, it is starting a major weapons program and if it ever wants to, it can quickly acquire a nuclear arsenal. India's direction is harder to predict, but it will almost certainly have more influence in the coming decades than in the past, and the United States has neither the capacity nor the desire to prevent it.
Therefore, instead of making futile efforts to turn back time, Americans should start preparing for a multipolar world.
Ideally, a world of unbalanced multipolarity would encourage the United States to move away from its instinctive reliance on hard force and intimidation and to invest more in real diplomacy. During the unipolar era, US officials were used to dealing with problems by making demands and ultimatums and then ratcheting up the pressure, starting with sanctions and threats of force and then resorting to fury and regime change when gentler measures of intimidation failed.
The disappointing results speak for themselves. In a multipolar world, by contrast, even the most powerful powers have to pay more attention to what others want and put more effort into persuading some of them to make mutually beneficial deals.
Take-it-or-leave-it diplomacy must give way to more subtle approaches and must involve more give and take; relying primarily on the threat of force will only cause others to distance themselves. In the worst case, they will start to unite in opposition.
Make no mistake: For the United States, and perhaps the world, a multipolar future is not without significant drawbacks. Weaker states in a world of competing great powers can outplay each other, meaning that American influence in some smaller states is likely to begin to decline. Rivalry between great powers in Eurasia can lead to miscalculations and war, as it did before 1945. More states may want nuclear weapons, in an era where technological advances may convince some people that such weapons are feasible. None of that is desirable.
However, assuming that the United States remains first among the unequal in a future multipolar world, its leaders should not be too concerned. Washington will be in an ideal situation to turn the other great powers against each other, and it can allow its partners in Eurasia to take greater responsibility for their security.
Although American leaders have long hidden their realist leanings behind a cloud of idealistic rhetoric, they were once very good at balancing power politics. Since multipolarity is making a comeback, their successors need to remember how to do it.
The article was taken from the magazine "Forin Polisi"
The author is a professor of international relations at Harvard University
Translation: N. Bogetić
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