Recruits from religious communities are challenging IDF values ​​once dominated by secular elites

Recruits from national-religious communities are challenging IDF values ​​once dominated by secular elites

Israel's military, which for most of its seven decades of existence has been the country's leading secular institution, is increasingly coming under the influence of a national-religious movement that has taken bold steps across Israeli society in recent years.

About 40% of those who graduate from the army's infantry officer schools now come from a national-religious community that makes up 12 to 14 percent of Jewish Israeli society and is politically more aligned with the Israeli right and far-right political parties and the settler movement. Critics argue that its growing influence – including that of an orthodox section known as the Hardalim – is pursuing its own agenda within the military.

The views of the national-religious community were shaped by the teachings of Abraham Isaac Kok, the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of pre-state British Palestine, who saw the establishment and settlement of the "Land of Israel" as a divine mission. For today's national-religious community, that country also includes the West Bank and Gaza.

The war in Gaza has led to some soldiers from that community, including officers, engaging in statements and religious activities promoting Jewish settlement of the Palestinian Territory, drawing condemnation from the top leadership of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Known as national-religious, religious Zionist or, colloquially, "knitted kippah" (after the style of headdress worn by men), the community is distinguished from ultra-Orthodox Jews, known as Haredi, who have long avoided military service. They see the army as a way to promote values ​​that, according to some key thinkers, are at odds with the more secular and progressive Israeli society.

"This is the fear of secular and progressive Israelis, that if they are national-religious in the most influential positions in the army, that this will not only determine the character of the struggle, but also the character of Israeli society as a whole," said Rabbi Ouri Cherki, a prominent spiritual leader in the national - religious community.

Yagil Levi, a professor of military relations at Israel's Open University, has documented the implementation of the IDF's infiltration campaign over recent decades, particularly the influence of national-religious military academies and yeshivas established to promote community influence.

"Academies provide religious education to strengthen those recruits when they join the military and increase their motivation to join combat roles and as officers. Twenty years later, we see an increasing presence of military college graduates in senior command roles as well as at less senior levels." , Levi said.

Critics of the academies include former deputy IDF chief Jair Golan, leader of the Democratic Party, who said some of them teach "anti-democratic values."

The rise in national-religious representation in the military in turn has led community leaders to point to what they say is a disproportionate number of their own members among soldiers killed in Gaza.

In addition to the documented incidents in Gaza, units operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the West Bank, which largely recruit people from national-religious backgrounds, have been accused of not intervening in violent attacks by Jewish settlers or in human rights violations committed by IDF troops.

The key turning point, Levy said, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision in 2005 to order the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in Gaza — a move the military carried out despite resistance from settlers.

"The withdrawal from Gaza is nationally and religiously understood as a failure and betrayal. They came to the conclusion that they will have to increase their presence in the army, to create another army that will not withdraw from the West Bank," he said.

As a consequence, tensions have arisen between top IDF commanders and the wider national-religious community and the far-right politicians who represent them, regarding senior military appointments.

The highly controversial figure of Brigadier General Ofer Winter, the most prominent graduate of the Eli Military Academy, has served as a lightning rod for these tensions in recent years. Supporters claim Winter, who was dismissed from the service earlier this year, was passed over as division commander. As a colonel during the 2014 Gaza war, Winter described the conflict with Hamas in terms of a religious struggle against "a blasphemous enemy that desecrates the God of Israel."

For some, the influence of graduates of national-religious-led military academies and yeshivas poses a question about Israeli democracy. When Golan attacked the academies earlier this year, he suggested they were at odds with the IDF and that some national-religious recruits should be educated about democracy.

Denying that he was "against religious Zionists" in the army, Golan said: "I opposed those institutions that teach anti-democratic values ​​with racist, fascist overtones that should not be heard in any educational institution in the State of Israel."

Yehuda Shaul, one of the founders of Project Ofek - Israel's Center for Public Affairs, described the growing influence of the academies as part of "a larger effort in Israeli society to try to replace the elites of the old school, the secular middle and upper classes with the national-religious... has been happening throughout society for years".

He said that in the IDF it was a long-term process. "In 1990, 2.5 percent of graduating infantry officer cadets came from national-religious communities. By 2014, that percentage was 40 percent. That is three times the representation of national-religious communities in Israeli society," said Shaul.

The progress of those cadets through the ranks would gradually lead to a greater number of high national-religious officers, he added. "Currently, we see a large representation of national-religious up to the level of brigade commander. But every five to ten years, they climb one rank higher," said Šaul.

"The top generals may still come from the old elite, but below them there is a new elite and this can be seen in the attitudes coming from the field. There will inevitably come a time when a large part of the high command staff will come from a national-religious background - and in the future they will this has implications for any government that wants to make decisions that are against that ideology," concludes Šaul.

He added: "We have already seen that issues of discipline linked to national-religious ideology have become almost unmanageable, and this has consequences for other matters, including issues such as the rules of when to take action."

In units with a high representation of national-religious recruits, the war in Gaza has, according to some, produced an atmosphere of extreme nationalist sympathy and a desire for revenge. However, it was not limited to the national-religious community.

Luiz Aberbuj, a Brazilian-born soldier who served in the Kfir Brigade during his national service from 2014 to 2016 and now serves as a reservist in the National Security Combat Battalion, noticed attitudes in his unit that existed before the current war.

"Very quickly there was some friction based on ideology with the Israeli guys. I heard some very radical ideologies during my service," he told the Guardian, adding that attendance at some religious events, including lectures and rabbinical classes, was mandatory.

"I'm sure that it affected the consciousness of some soldiers and the way they see their role in this complex situation. I remember that it disturbed me during my service", added Aberbuj.

During the current conflict in Gaza, it was not only the rabbis who shared their views. "We saw a great mobilization of people coming to the base to bring donations, to empower the soldiers," he said.

"There were many religious aspects. Someone would put a phylactery [small black boxes worn for prayer] on a table or they would give you little prayer books to take to the front. The same discourse is very right-wing, very religious, even messianic, talking about Gaza as 'ours' and 'we deserve it' ... with a lot of prejudice against the Palestinians. There is a heavy atmosphere of revenge," Aberbuj explained.

Among the soldiers in Gaza, this was reflected in behavior, documented on their own social networks, that drew condemnation from the IDF.

He is recorded speaking in messianic terms about revenge, sometimes quoting religious texts. Soldiers set up makeshift synagogues in Palestinian homes they occupied. Tanks in Khan Yunis, in southern Gaza, were seen flying the orange-and-black flag of Gush Katif, a former Israeli settlement in Palestinian territory that was evacuated in 2005. The slogan was written on the flag: "We will build it, we are returning to Gush Katif".

Elsewhere, the unit posted a video on Telegram of a soldier addressing the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, by his nickname.

"We are here to create light after the black Sabbath that the Israeli people had. We occupy, deport and settle. We occupy, deport and settle. Did you hear that, Bibi? We occupy, deport and settle," said the soldier.

For Cherki, settlement has been a key motivation for national-religious military service since the occupation of the Palestinian territories after the 1967 Six-Day War. "Because of this, many religious joined the military, which in turn led to the creation of religious schools that combined military service with religious learning," the rabbi said.

"As the country progressed, the national-religious got more and more space in Israeli society, reaching the point where many fighters in combat units come from the movement. This is the reason why many of the dead in this war come from the national-religious movement," he said. .

Cherki is among those who believe the IDF acted to block promotion to the highest ranks of members of his community. He cites the example of Winter, although the IDF has long denied claims that his membership in the community was linked to his failure to be promoted to division commander. "There is a 'glass ceiling' among high commanders [for national-religious officers]. Matkal [high command] takes care of ideological change in the army. National-religious soldiers who come into the army come with their own ideology ... and that has consequences in thinking about the morality of the fight," Cerki said.

An IDF spokesman said: "The IDF does not differentiate or discriminate against its recruits based on their religious identity. IDF units are made up of individuals from diverse backgrounds, both secular and religious, all serving together. As for the specific cases mentioned in connection with IDF soldiers filming, taking pictures and participating in provocative or political videos or images, the IDF acts to resolve exceptional incidents that deviate from the orders and expected values ​​of IDF soldiers. The IDF investigates events of this type as well reports on videos posted on social networks and deals with them through command and disciplinary measures".