"The day after" in Gaza seems like a fantasy

After almost 300 days, plans to end the fighting in Gaza are beginning to sound like fantasy stories. Politicians and generals are discussing what might happen when the shooting stops for the first time since the war began in October. Diplomats have been traveling the Middle East for months, trying to broker a truce. Yet that moment has not come—and even if it does, the obstacles to lasting peace in Gaza are daunting.

When many Western officials talk about "the day after," they have a specific scenario in mind. It starts with strengthening the Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, so it can return to Gaza and run things. Israel would commit to ending its half-century-long occupation and creating a Palestinian state. This would allow Saudi Arabia, the most influential Arab country, to normalize relations with Israel. A devastating war could give way to lasting regional peace.

It is an optimistic vision, but also an unlikely one. It rests on two questionable assumptions. The first is that the fighting in Gaza will indeed stop - that there will be a clear line between the war and its consequences. Another is that complex, phased regional diplomacy can bring immediate relief to the 2,2 million Gazans in urgent need of aid.

In reality, the “day after” may look a lot like today. Even if there is a truce to exchange hostages, Israel will eventually continue military raids in Gaza. Hamas will continue to fight. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, will not commit to Palestinian statehood, stalling any major diplomatic effort. And someone will have to provide security, distribute aid and begin the reconstruction of an enclave that has been sinking deeper and deeper into anarchy and misery for the past nine months. No one has a serious plan for how to do it - they just hope that someone else will.

Powerlessness, homelessness, helplessness

The scale of the problem is enormous. Let's start with security. Israeli troops control two corridors in Gaza: one in the center, the other along the border with Egypt. The rest of the territory is mostly unorganized. Criminals steal humanitarian aid, run extortion schemes at ATMs and loot destroyed homes and shops. Crammed into tent camps, civilians wage violent (and sometimes deadly) disputes over food and other supplies. The police who maintained security in Gaza before the war have largely disappeared: they fear being targeted by Israel or are busy caring for their families.

Officials in Ramallah, the administrative capital, say they may organize a police force to restore basic law and order. America is interested in this idea. However, what such a force would not do is fight Hamas. Although Israel has killed many fighters and leaders of the militant group, including, it is believed, the leader of its armed wing, Muhamada Deifa On July 13, many are still there. Those remaining might be willing to cede civilian rule in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority so that someone else can clean up the mess. Disarmament is another story. "If they stop resisting, they will cease to exist. Hamas will continue the fight," said a Palestinian Authority official.

Hamas would also be a threat to the Palestinian Authority. If Hamas thinks the Palestinian Authority is gaining too much power in Gaza, it will not hesitate to attack its rival.

The solution, the official claims, is to bring Arab peacekeepers into Gaza. Hamas would not target the Palestinian Authority if it had the support of powerful Arab states.

Politicians in Israel have a similar hope. Yair Golan, who leads the Labor Party, thinks "moderate Sunni countries" like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates would help secure and govern parts of Gaza. People close to Netanyahu make similar statements. It also does that Naftali Bennett, former prime minister.

The only skeptics are the potential peacemakers themselves. Not that Arab countries are ruling out any role in Gaza. The Gulf countries would allocate funds for reconstruction; Jordan could help train security forces. But no one is inclined to send troops, lest they be seen as helping Israeli repression. Even if they agreed, Arab militaries have limited experience in peacekeeping missions and even less in cooperation with others. Joint forces would require an unprecedented level of cooperation.

Without security, post-war Gaza will be bleak. Powerlessness is already making it difficult for the UN to distribute aid - and the people of Gaza cannot survive without it. The International Labor Organization estimates that 79% of them are unemployed. The economy is devastated: GDP is down 84% since October. Hospitals mostly stopped working, children missed almost an entire year of school.

Mohamad Mustafa, the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, says they are ready to take responsibility. Over coffee in his office in Ramallah, he and his advisers lay out plans to restore basic services like education and health. But it is difficult to reconcile this optimism with the grim reality of the Palestinian Authority. She went bankrupt. Civil servants did not receive their salaries for May until July 10 (and half received only partial salaries). Mr. Mustafa and his boss, Mahmud Abbas, the president of Palestine, are very unpopular. The Palestinian Authority, in other words, barely has the capacity to govern the West Bank, let alone Gaza.

Even if she could, Netanyahu would not allow it. For months, he resisted American pressure to approve a role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Some Israeli officers have instead begun talking about creating enclaves run by Palestinians not affiliated with Hamas. Israel would direct aid to those areas. The locals would distribute it; over time, they would establish ad hoc administrative systems for the provision of basic services. The army calls them "bubbles". Golan, who was deputy chief of the army before entering politics, calls them "islands of hope". "It is not enough to destroy the military capabilities of Hamas. You have to provide an alternative," says Golan.

This is a common counterinsurgency approach, commonly called the “ink strategy”. But Palestinian and Western officials say that is a fantasy. Hamas has already killed or assaulted several members of prominent families in Gaza to discourage such cooperation.

Also, such local administrations would not be capable of rebuilding Gaza. More than half of the buildings in the enclave have been destroyed, the UN says. Close to 400.000 homes were damaged or destroyed. Even clearing the rubble will be an unprecedented challenge. The World Bank estimated in April that damage to homes, businesses and infrastructure in the enclave would cost $18,5 billion to repair, equivalent to 97% of Palestine's pre-war GDP (and much more than today). Donors will not contribute much until Gaza has both security and an administration capable of overseeing the massive reconstruction effort. "Until Hamas disappears, no one will come," says an official close to Netanyahu.

As long as there is a possibility for Hamas to regenerate, the IDF believes it will have to maintain its corridors inside Gaza and is providing a buffer zone a kilometer or more wide that it has cleared along the Gaza border. An analysis by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz estimates that Israeli troops now control 26% of Gaza. No one would control the other 74% and continued Israeli occupation would be an obstacle to peace talks.

There is also the question of who controls the border crossings in Gaza, through which aid and possibly building materials for reconstruction must pass. Israel has been reluctant to reopen crossings from its territory, which before the war handled two-thirds of Gaza's imports.

But he also wants to question the management of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, through which Hamas smuggles most of its weapons. Uncertainty will continue to reduce aid flows.

The most likely outcome of all this is that a weakened Hamas will compete with the clans and gangs in Gaza where there will be mostly lawlessness. Crime and violence would be rampant. Aid organizations would have to make deals with armed men to protect their convoys. Charities would try to repair a few key pieces of infrastructure, such as the desalination plant, but major reconstruction would remain a distant dream. Some UN officials have started calling this scenario "Mogadishu in the Mediterranean".

An alternative could be called the "West Bank model". Perhaps Israeli lawmakers initiate early elections to remove the unpopular Netanyahu from office, and his successor to allow some role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, at least in civilian matters. Or perhaps, in the midst of so much hardship, necessity forces Gazans to cooperate with the Israeli military to restart basic services.

Still, even if the Israeli opposition succeeds in replacing Netanyahu, the prospects for a two-state solution are slim. Opposition party leaders admit that Israelis are currently "too traumatized" by the October 7 massacre to consider such a possibility. A recent poll commissioned by a right-wing think-tank found that 64% of Israelis oppose a Palestinian state, even if it means abandoning the historic peace agreement with Saudi Arabia.

So Israel will probably end up as the occupying power in Gaza, as it already is in the West Bank. "There will be Palestinians who control municipal functions. But we will be able to come in and out whenever we want," says Yoaz Hendel, a former Israeli minister and reserve colonel in the army. Unrestricted occupation is perhaps less terrible than anarchy. But hopes for regional peace will be dashed, and even recovery could be slow. The Gulf states, for example, say they will not open their checkbooks without a long-term plan for Palestinian statehood.

Let's be real

On the outskirts of Cairo, where the city's chaotic sprawl gives way to a scorched desert, three Gazan women have fled the war, but they haven't escaped it. They live with their children in a dark apartment, sleeping on donated mattresses, cooking donated food in donated pots. Their husbands are still in Gaza: it was cheaper and easier to send only women and children. The TV is constantly on Al Jazeera, and every report of a deadly Israeli attack in Gaza brings a moment of worry. They hope to return home one day, but not if it means returning to a miserable tent camp.

No one knows how many Gazans have fled to Egypt since the war began. One aid worker in Cairo says the number could be as low as 80 to 300 people — between 4% and 14% of Gaza's pre-war population. Most paid exorbitant sums to escape, up to $5.000 per adult and $2.500 per child, to a company with close ties to Egypt's security services.

Waiting, fear, sadness: this is life for Gazans, inside or outside the enclave. Talking about the day after the war seems like a hopeless abstraction.

Translation: S. Strugar