The Middle East has reached a point where it is increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to distinguish action from reaction.
After almost certainly Hezbollah mistakenly attacked a Druze village in the occupied Golan Heights last week, Israel responded with an airstrike that killed a senior Hezbollah commander. Then came the assassination in Iran of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas and the main negotiator in the Gaza ceasefire talks. A few days earlier there had also been an exchange of fire between Israel and the Houthis, a third organization backed by Iran.
All this happened after months of military clashes along the border between Israel and Lebanon that forced some 60.000 Israelis and at least as many Lebanese to flee their homes.
The question is what comes next? And what should the US do about it?
It is hard to imagine that the Gaza negotiations will succeed at this point. Even before the killings, the two sides disagreed on the extent of the cessation of hostilities or the acceptability of continued Israeli military presence in Gaza. It is entirely possible that at present all that will be achieved is a continuation of the conflict in Gaza with a significantly reduced intensity.
It is not clear whether a massive escalation between Israel and Hezbollah can be avoided. An even bigger question may be whether direct conflict between Israel and Iran can be prevented. The two countries narrowly avoided war in April when, following another Israeli assassination, Iran attacked Israeli territory with more than 300 drones and missiles. Israel, partly at the urging of the US, chose a measured response that appeared to be an attempt to demonstrate its ability to penetrate Iranian defenses rather than to cause significant damage.
The key question now may be what the US can do to calm the situation. For all its power, American influence is significantly limited. But limited is not the same as non-existent.
Washington should focus on four things. First, the Biden administration should not back down from calling for a cease-fire in Gaza. Obviously, achieving this will be more difficult than ever. But Israel increasingly lacks a military reason to continue the war. It also has a renewed incentive to divert its troops and equipment to other fronts, and there is considerable domestic pressure to release Israeli hostages held in Gaza. So the effort would not be in vain.
Second, the US should press Israel to remain open to a diplomatic approach to the situation in southern Lebanon. A war with Hezbollah would hardly put Israel in a better situation, given the more than 100.000 rockets in Hezbollah's arsenal - rockets that can reach Israel's populated areas and seriously damage its already weakened economy. Meanwhile, history shows that Israel's occupation of Lebanon is unlikely to bring positive results. The goal should be to enable the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Some mutual withdrawal of forces might be possible.
Third, it is inevitable that Iran will respond to the humiliation of Haniyeh's assassination on its own soil, just hours after he met with Iran's new president and its supreme leader. It makes sense to pressure China (which is significantly dependent on Iranian oil) to advocate for a limited Iranian response. Then, as in April, the US could advocate a limited Israeli response.
Fourth, the US should not abandon the larger, long-term goal of creating a political alternative to Hamas—one that is willing to work toward reasonable Palestinian political goals and live in peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia remains a natural partner in this regard. Her willingness to normalize relations with Israel could have a real impact on the Israeli political debate.
Also, there is something the US should avoid. There will be those who will argue that Washington should stop supplying arms to Israel. There is certainly a strong case for withholding certain munitions that are causing widespread civilian casualties in Gaza. One could also argue for political and economic sanctions regarding Israeli settlements. And there is more than enough reason to be frustrated with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who did not notify the US before Hani's assassination despite his central role in efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and the return of hostages.
But the focus has now shifted from Gaza (where military operations have subsided since their winter peak) to reducing the chance of new major fronts between Israel and Hezbollah or Israel and Iran. In this changed context, it is crucial for Iran to understand that US support for Israel is strong and that armed escalation on their part, or on the part of their proxies, will not achieve the desired goals.
One more thing. Also, there is the possibility that providing weapons to Israel could increase the influence of the US in the way it uses them. The Biden administration has been reluctant to take this path during the Gaza crisis and has largely looked the other way as Israel has taken actions contrary to American interests — and sometimes its own. The US may want to reconsider this position as it may soon find itself supporting another war, or even one, at a time when it is already burdened.
The author is a senior advisor at Centerview Partners, chairman emeritus of the Council on International Relations, and a former US diplomat.
The article is taken from "Financial Times".
translation: S. Strugar
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