On March 25 of this year, the American Embassy in Budapest strongly criticized Hungary. In a video posted on Facebook, embassy officials condemned the country's government for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas at a time when most of Europe was weaning itself off dependence on Moscow.
"The Hungarian government has decided to increase its dependence on Russian energy... at any cost. Only the Hungarian political leadership decided to keep the country dependent on Russian energy," the video states.
Just over a month later, Hungary fought back. However, she did not do so by addressing the essence of Washington's criticism, nor by arguing that there is nothing wrong with buying gas from Russia. Instead, she criticized the United States of America.
"Who was the biggest supplier of uranium to the USA last year?" asked the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs indignantly. Peter Sijarto. "Russia". Americans have spent "more than a billion dollars" on Russian uranium in 2023, he added. However, "they put pressure on us not to buy fuel from there".
Sijarto is not the only foreign official to counter US criticism by using "whataboutism" - the tactic of deflecting attention from one's own bad behavior by pointing to the bad behavior of another actor. When American officials indicted the Russian president Vladimir Putin for meddling in the 2016 US election, Putin pointed to the long history of US meddling in foreign elections.
After Washington criticized Turkey for stifling media freedom, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan published a report on media freedom violations in the United States, including the arrests of journalists during the 2014 Black Lives Matter protests.
At first glance, “whataboutism” may seem like a weak way to respond to criticism. After all, it has long been considered a logical fallacy: two mistakes do not make one right. The US government is not without its sins either. US officials routinely, continuously and openly condemn foreign governments, whether friend or foe.
However, in the first research of its kind, we found strong evidence that "whataboutism" is actually very effective, both domestically and internationally. When the United States criticizes a country and that country retaliates with a "whataboutism" response, the American public's support for punishing that country declines.
Allied populations become less inclined to join US-led condemnations or sanctions. These results proved true whether "whataboutism" was used by America's enemy or ally. In other words, this tactic is a valuable tool for all states that want to challenge American policies and negate Washington's narratives.
However, while whataboutism works, it is not omnipotent. Our research found that “whataboutism” was very successful when foreign governments pointed to recent American actions that resembled their own—in other words, when Washington was being hypocritical. But it was less effective when foreign governments cited abuse that happened long ago, and almost entirely ineffective when they cited an unrelated wrongdoing. American decision makers, therefore, can successfully criticize others as long as their criticisms cannot be easily reversed.
In some cases, however, US officials should accept that silence is golden. It can often be better to simply let another country's actions speak for themselves. In the future, American leaders should try to keep Washington's domestic and international reputation as clean as possible. After all, it is the only sure way to avoid whataboutism.
CALLING CULTURE
Since the 19th century, states have responded to external accusations by shifting the blame to the accuser. For example, after the British government condemned the state pogroms against the Jews in Russia during 1881–82, a Russian newspaper close to the tsarist regime rebuked London for its own crimes against humanity: “The concern of England, which impoverished the populations of India and Egypt, which poisoned the people of China with opium, which destroyed, like native insects, the natives of Australia... the care of a people who do such things is truly astounding".
In the 20th century, "whataboutism" became even more common. During World War I, the Allied Powers accused Germany of war crimes; in response, the German government commissioned 93 prominent German academics to write an open letter condemning the Allies for using dumdum bullets and killing civilian women and children. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union often used "whataboutism" in its fight against Washington, regardless of specific American accusations. Moscow has particularly criticized the United States for its poor treatment of blacks. To this day, the expression "and you lynch blacks" is often used in Russia and many Eastern European countries as a synonym for the use of "whataboutism".
Today, whataboutism is an even more powerful tool of public diplomacy, thanks to the amplification made possible by the Internet. It is used for countries to condemn their enemies, as is the case when Russia criticizes the United States for its human rights violations. It is used between countries with complex relationships. It is even used by states to condemn their allies. In May 2023, for example, the French Minister of the Interior Gerald Darmanin he criticized the Italian Prime Minister George Meloni because she was not "capable of solving migration problems, which is why she was elected". In response, Italian officials and the media pointed out that France had failed to send more than a handful of police officers to help frontline states stem the flow of migrants.
Governments have long been concerned about whataboutism criticism. For example, in 1985, Renegade the administration organized and financed a special conference in Washington, dedicated to contesting the comparison of the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. However, analysts have not yet systematically studied whether "whataboutism" functions as a tool of international state policy. To fill that gap, we conducted two surveys of more than 2.500 respondents, both of which were a representative sample of the American public. In each survey, we gave respondents hypothetical examples in which the United States criticizes other countries for interfering in elections and mishandling refugees. We asked them to what extent they approve of Washington's statements and whether they support the introduction of sanctions. We randomly divided the respondents into two groups. Some randomly selected respondents answered these questions without being given a "whataboutist" answer beforehand. Other participants responded after reading hypothetical "whataboutist" responses from other states.
Our results were clear: "whataboutism" is highly effective in reducing the American public's support for foreign policy initiatives. He significantly reduced support for criticism of foreign countries. For example, before hearing the "whataboutist" criticism, 56 percent of respondents approved of Washington's criticism of a foreign country's actions. But after hearing her, approval dropped to 38 percent. "Whataboutism" also reduced support for imposing sanctions. Before the "whataboutist" response, 59 percent of respondents supported sanctions in response to the actions of a foreign country. After that, support dropped to 49 percent. And "whataboutism" led Americans to consider the actions condemned by Washington more morally acceptable. The percentage of respondents who believed that the actions of that country were just as justified as the American one, increased from 32 percent to 41 percent.
In subsequent research (with political scientist Atsushi Taga), we tested whether "whataboutism" has the same effect on US allies. To do this, we recruited a representative sample of UK and Japanese residents and asked them to answer a similar survey. We have again established that "whataboutism" works. After hearing "whataboutist" responses directed at the United States, British and Japanese respondents became significantly less inclined to support joining criticism of Washington. For example, before hearing the "whataboutist" criticism, 59 percent of British and 46 percent of Japanese respondents approved of joining the American criticism. After hearing "whataboutist" answers, support dropped to 37 percent in the United Kingdom and 29 percent in Japan. Respondents were also less supportive of their government joining any US sanctions: support fell from 58 percent to 41 percent in the United Kingdom and from 34 percent to 27 percent in Japan. Finally, whataboutism increased respondents' tendency to see the United States and actors using whataboutism as morally equivalent. The percentage of British respondents who believed that the actions were equally justified increased from 30 percent to 42 percent. Among Japanese respondents, that percentage increased from 27 percent to 34 percent.
It is interesting that the identity of the actor using "whataboutism" had no influence on the public in America, Britain or Japan. "Whataboutism" from US adversaries such as Russia has been just as effective as responses from close allies. Also, the US government could not counter the "whataboutism" by claiming that their bad move had supposedly good intentions, such as the promotion of democracy. As a result, American efforts to counter "whataboutism," as at the 1985 conference, likely failed. Likewise, apologies for past mistakes have not been successful. (According to our research, US government apologies, at best, only modestly neutralize the negative effects of "whataboutism"). There is simply no rhetorical strategy that can eliminate the power of this technique.
GLASS HOUSES
For Washington, these findings are very inconvenient, to say the least. United States officials find criticizing hostile foreign governments a very attractive and relatively inexpensive way to damage their international reputation and please various domestic constituencies. As a result, they often engage in public condemnation. However, when foreign powers can easily dismiss these criticisms by citing some American actions, such statements are unlikely to have much effect. Moreover, they may end up doing more harm than good; "Whataboutist" reactions, after all, divert attention from the actions of other governments and focus it on the bad actions of Washington.
However, the effectiveness of "whataboutism" can vary. According to our research, it largely depends on the nature and timing of the American procedure in question. "Whataboutism" referring to recent, similar American works had a powerful effect. However, American works from much older periods, such as those from the interwar period or the early Cold War, had less impact. And "whataboutism" that referred to American actions that are not essentially related to the original accusation had a very weak effect, sometimes it was not there at all. This was the case even when foreign powers brought up highly notorious and recent US wrongdoing, such as the torture of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo and elsewhere.
For this reason, American decision makers should reconsider their approach to "whataboutist" accusations. Instead of reacting immediately, they should first carefully check their own history and adjust their messages to avoid accusations of hypocrisy. To achieve this, US government agencies could instruct their employees to work carefully with colleagues who have institutional memory and relevant expertise before making statements. Officials could also request an assessment of the impact of "whataboutism" before making major speeches or launching new initiatives, as they already do in economic and humanitarian assessments.
To see why American policymakers should adopt such measures, consider the speech that the American ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, held in March 2022, in which she harshly criticized Russia for invading Ukraine. During her speech, Thomas-Greenfield reprimanded Moscow for using cluster bombs. But that was a serious rhetorical error: The United States, like Russia, has never signed an international convention banning these weapons, and according to a 2017 Defense Department memo, US war plans still allow for their use under certain conditions. As a result, Washington had to quickly issue a statement retracting its criticism of the use of cluster bombs, which was done quickly enough to avoid a Russian response.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is so broad and severe that it is possible for the United States to condemn the action in ways that do not invite "whataboutist" accusations. However, in some cases it may not be possible for Washington to issue unencumbered warnings. In such situations, it may be best if US officials do not make statements at all. This can be difficult for American actors accustomed to free expression. But they should remember that if they stay silent, they avoid making statements that could potentially harm their broader foreign policy goals.
Finally, in the future, the United States should seek to avoid policy decisions inconsistent with stated American values and principles. Washington, for example, should work to avoid mistreatment of prisoners. It should reject economic sanctions that cause significant and unnecessary harm to civilians. And in most cases, it should not launch invasions or otherwise attempt to overthrow foreign governments without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.
But that's easier said than done. The United States cannot simply overturn deep-seated injustices. Reasonable people can disagree about whether certain decisions are morally acceptable. And breaking normative rules can help Washington achieve goals that would otherwise be difficult to achieve, making such decisions attractive to officials. But the short-sighted use of American power can fester for years. The CIA, for example, aided the coups in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, which quickly eliminated perceived communist threats and secured Western interests in those countries. The 2003 invasion of Iraq quickly toppled an autocrat who hated the United States.
But each of these actions seriously violated the fundamental international norm of state sovereignty, and became strong examples of Washington's double standards. To this day, these cases are used by foreign actors when the United States chooses to criticize them.
Foreign governments can and do use the history of the United States against Washington. Their criticism undermines domestic and international support for American actions. Consequently, the United States should avoid making unethical decisions in pursuit of narrow, short-term goals. This will save future American officials from many unpleasant encounters with the ghosts of America's past.
The authors of the text are Wilfred M. Chou, Assistant Professor at the School of International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China, and Dov H. Levin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong.
Translation: S. STRUGAR
Bonus video:
