Iran could start the race for a nuclear bomb

With Iran's "axis of resistance" under attack by Israel weakening, the clerical regime in Tehran may feel it needs a stronger deterrent.

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A new generation of Iranian centrifuges on display on the occasion of the National Nuclear Energy Day in Tehran 2021, Photo: Reuters
A new generation of Iranian centrifuges on display on the occasion of the National Nuclear Energy Day in Tehran 2021, Photo: Reuters
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

When Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, was killed in an Israeli bomb attack last Sunday, it was not just the beheading of a fearsome militia that has forced some 60.000 Israelis to flee their homes due to frequent rocket attacks. It also dealt a heavy blow to Iran's "axis of resistance," a constellation of proxy forces that Iran has used for decades to attack Israel and Western interests in the Middle East. In addition to the attack on Hezbollah, the months-long dismemberment of Hamas in Gaza has significantly reduced Iran's ability to cause trouble if it feels threatened. Those defeats, in turn, may encourage Iran to rely on its other form of deterrence: its nuclear program.

In recent days, amid Israeli attacks on Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran-backed militants in Yemen, Iranian officials have begun to insinuate that Israeli aggression could encourage Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Others suggested that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, could revoke an earlier fatwa, or religious decree, banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The regime has been expanding the number and sophistication of the centrifuges it uses to refine uranium. He now has a large stockpile of material close to the quality required for weapons. It is possible, though not yet likely, that Khamenei may decide that the only way to protect his regime, which is despised even by its own citizens and vulnerable to Israeli attack, is to develop nuclear weapons.

America and Israel have long promised that they will not allow Iran to build a bomb. Israel, in particular, appears to have detailed intelligence on the progress of Iran's nuclear program. If he sees signs that Iran is crossing the threshold, he could attack Iran's nuclear sites - something he came close to doing in 2011. However, there is no guarantee that it would work. Informed Israeli sources, in rare moments of candor, admit that the chance to significantly cripple Iran's nuclear program with airstrikes may have passed: the relevant facilities are too deep in the country, and nuclear know-how has spread. The bombing would set the region on fire while only delaying the program for a few months, some claim.

Protests in Tehran regarding the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah
Protests in Tehran regarding the assassination of Hassan Nasrallahphoto: Reuters

The first question is what kind of arsenal Iran is aiming for. Nuclear weapons require three things: a core of fossil material, such as enriched uranium; a warhead that can contain that material and start a chain reaction that ends in an explosion; and a delivery system, such as a bomb or rocket, to transport the warhead to the target. Iran might not produce it all at once. It could produce weapons material without a functional warhead, or build a warhead without an appropriate delivery system.

Iran could also build a full weapon but, like Israel, refrain from announcing that it has done so. The intent behind such non-transparency is to reap the benefits of nuclear deterrence without incurring all the diplomatic costs. Much would depend on how open Iran would be. He could build the weapon in complete secrecy, assuming that deterrence would be effective because foreign intelligence agencies would have some idea of ​​what he was doing. He could signal his intentions more clearly by expelling international inspectors, withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and revoking the fatwa. Or it could conduct a nuclear test, guaranteeing that it has a working device and demonstrating its capabilities to the world, but also drawing international condemnation.

Informed Israeli sources, in rare moments of candor, admit that the chance to significantly cripple Iran's nuclear program with airstrikes may have passed: the relevant facilities are too deep in the country, and nuclear know-how has spread. The bombing would set the region on fire while only delaying the program for a few months, some claim

Regardless of whether Iran overtly or covertly crossed the nuclear threshold, it would have to decide how many bombs to build and how to use them. It could, like Israel in the 1960s, build just a few devices in the hope that allies will come to its aid when threatened to avoid nuclear war. Iran's problem is that it has no clear protectors: it is not certain that Russia would intervene to save the regime. Another option would be to emulate India. This would entail building a larger, albeit modest, arsenal that could survive the enemy's first strike, allowing for later retaliation.

Ten years ago, many experts and officials believed that the Indian option was the most likely direction for Iran. That would appeal to Iran's leaders, who could retain tight control over the weapons -- as they have done with chemical weapons in the past -- rather than handing over authority for their use to commanders on the ground. However, in recent years, Iranian assessments may have changed. The military gap between Israel and Iran appears to be widening. Moreover, the regime is increasingly vulnerable at home, facing growing discontent. He is also becoming bolder militarily, as he showed when he launched missiles at Pakistan in January and more recently at Israel.

Iran's emboldened generals might prefer a third option: the Pakistani model, in which they would build a much larger arsenal—hundreds instead of dozens of warheads—designed for first and rapid use in a conflict to fend off even smaller conventional military threats. This could require building small nuclear weapons, deploying them widely to ensure they can be used in a crisis, and delegating authority for their use to commanders in the field.

The choice of option relates to another question: How would nuclear capabilities shape Iran's behavior? In 1981, political scientist Kenneth Volz published an essay titled "Nuclear Proliferation: More Can Be Better," in which he argued that countries tend to become more secure and therefore more cautious when armed with nuclear weapons. "It has been proven without exception that anyone who gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation," Volz claimed years later, speaking of Iran. In 2007, Jacques Chirac, then president of France, was phlegmatic about the idea of ​​a nuclear Iran. "What is dangerous in this situation is not the fact that we have a nuclear bomb," he said. "Having one or maybe another bomb a little later, so that's not too dangerous."

The regime in Tehran has been expanding the number and sophistication of the centrifuges it uses to refine uranium. He now has a large stockpile of material close to the quality required for weapons

Many others are horrified by these arguments. Scott Sagan, another political scientist, made two counterarguments. One is the risk that nuclear material could be stolen or sold to terrorists, either by renegade members of the regime or with its approval. Another is that the weapon could serve as a “nuclear shield,” allowing Iran to become more aggressive, safe in the knowledge that it cannot be attacked. That's exactly what happened with Pakistan, Sagan argued: The country's military allowed paramilitary groups and masked troops into Indian-controlled territory in 1999, in part because acquiring nuclear weapons the previous year made military officials more confident. It is similar with North Korea, which after its first nuclear test in 2006 torpedoed a South Korean ship in 2010.

Iran's missile system next to a photo of Ali Khamenei in Tehran
Iran's missile system next to a photo of Ali Khamenei in Tehran photo: Reuters

How would these dynamic patterns be reflected in Iran? Iran, like Pakistan, has a long history of financing, arming and supporting armed groups to compensate for conventional military weakness and pressure its adversaries, with Israel at the fore. The regime would not want to share nuclear technology with intermediaries, as much as some militant groups would like to obtain some nuclear material through their sympathizers within the Iranian security forces. However, he could easily decide that the immunity afforded by nuclear weapons allows him to increase his support for proxy groups and encourage those groups to intensify pressure on Israel.

However, this question is not so simple. Nuclear weapons provide security, but not complete immunity from attack. In 1982, Argentina attacked the Falkland Islands despite the British nuclear capability. Iran's missile attacks on Israel and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, prove that nuclear shields have their weaknesses. Moreover, Pakistan tends to welcome Islamist brokers into its territory - and even then India carried out airstrikes against them in 2019. Iran preferred to nurture foreign groups far from its borders. So, unless Iran were to extend its nuclear protection to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen - which is unlikely, primarily because it would require a fairly large arsenal with a sophisticated command and control infrastructure, capable of surviving multiple rounds of attack - and groups were still exposed to American and Israeli military power.

That raises a third question: How would others respond to an Iran that has successfully built and deployed nuclear weapons? In the 1960s, America considered an attack on China's incipient arsenal. She decided to give up such a risky operation. Today, it is clear that Israeli intelligence has penetrated deep into Iran and, along with America, may feel it can locate and attack where warheads are assembled or stored. That in itself could trigger unrest inside Iran, Iranian retaliation against US bases and Arab states, as well as a wider regional war, which could overlap with existing conflicts.

Nuclear weapons provide security, but not complete immunity from attack. In 1982, Argentina attacked the Falkland Islands despite the British nuclear capability. Iran's missile attacks on Israel and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, prove that nuclear shields have their weaknesses

In practice, the answer might be more subtle. "Although Iran's nuclear test would be met with worldwide condemnation and lead to a temporary surge in support for new sanctions against Tehran, enthusiasm would wane in the coming months and years," said Eric Brewer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Iran is already subject to many sanctions; China and Russia would help protect it from any additional sanctions that might follow. And if the arsenal could not be eliminated, Iran's rivals would turn to deterring it from being used - as the Americans tried to do in Asia after North Korea acquired nuclear weapons in 2006.

America would likely extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia, other Arab allies and Israel, which currently lack formal guarantees. That move, which would raise many questions — whether America would deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Middle East, for example, as it does in Europe — would have two goals. One would be to convince Iran that any use of its weapons would risk the destruction of the regime. Another would be to dissuade America's friends in the region from pursuing nuclear weapons of their own.

Saudi Arabia has long maintained that it will respond to Iran's bomb development by building its own. Egypt, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are also likely to explore such an option. This does not mean that a nuclear arms race is inevitable. The UAE wants to reduce tensions with Iran and avoid a regional conflict, not become a target. Egypt is insolvent and dysfunctional, far from being a threat. Jordan is bankrupt. Even Saudi Arabia would probably prefer American protection to the uncertain pursuit of the bomb, which it might only be able to get with Pakistan's help.

Israel faces a different dilemma. Since the 1960s, Israel has been reticent about its nuclear weapons, saying only that it would not be the first country to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the region. Israel would face strong pressure to reconsider that policy and publicly declare its nuclear status, despite the inevitable diplomatic condemnation. Israeli leaders may also want to highlight their nuclear capabilities, displaying bomb-carrying submarines and missiles. A nuclear test is also one of the possibilities.

That would be risky, warns Richard Nephew from the Middle East Policy Institute in Washington. "If they provide a lot of new information about their alleged weapons programs, they might even reveal weaknesses or flaws that no one thinks they have," he says. "Keeping those weapons secret can have a much greater deterrent value than showing them off, since everyone assumes they must have something cutting edge."

In any case, the deterrence dynamic between Israel and Iran would be worryingly unchecked. America and the Soviet Union worked as allies for several years before engaging in a nuclear dispute. India and Pakistan had well established channels of communication. Israel and Iran have no such history. Over the past year, their shadow war has grown increasingly fierce. An Iranian bomb would be a dangerous and unpredictable addition to an already explosive region.

Translation: NB

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