The Lessons and Legacy of the Seventh of October

A year ago, Hamas killed about 1.200 people, mostly civilians, in Israel and took more than 250 hostages. Since then, Israel has reduced most of Gaza to rubble; more than 40.000 of its residents are reported to have died, and that figure includes 10.000-20.000 Hamas fighters. More than 700 Israeli soldiers have lost their lives fighting Hamas and other Iranian-backed proxies.

The conflict is clearly far from over. Rarely does a day go by without new military strikes and casualties. However, the most intense phase of the conflict in Gaza appears to be coming to an end: with Hamas weakened militarily, Israeli leaders have turned north, attacking Hezbollah leaders and resources in Lebanon. Therefore, it is not too early to try to summarize and assess the lessons and legacy of October 7.

For starters, assumptions can be dangerous. The attack surprised Israel for the second time in its history (the first was the launch of the October War in 1973). Although there were warnings about what Hamas was planning, senior military and political officials did not take them seriously. They continued to deploy most of the Israel Defense Forces battalions in the West Bank, leaving the border with Gaza almost unguarded. As 50 years ago, complacency has proved costly.

The October 7 attack also showed that the enemy of your enemy is not necessarily your friend. For a decade, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has provided significant economic support to Hamas, with the explicit hope that this would better position Hamas to compete with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Netanyahu's goal was to divide the Palestinians, weaken the influence of voices of Palestinian nationalism more acceptable on the international stage, and thereby make a two-state solution impossible.

Israel also managed to contribute to the weakening of the PU. However, he was wrong in believing that he could bribe Hamas.

Wars are as much political as they are military undertakings. It is possible to win a war on the battlefield and still lose it. Israel did just that in Gaza, choosing to wage a conventional war against an unconventional enemy without a plan for what comes next. Military success must be translated into lasting security and governance arrangements. However, Israeli officials refuse to propose any solution, fearing that a viable plan would require a PA role, along with an Arab stabilization force, which would create momentum toward a Palestinian state and spark internal conflicts in Israel that could bring down Netanyahu's government.

To make matters worse, Israel defines success, the eradication of Hamas, in terms that cannot be met. Israel thus loses because it does not win, while Hamas wins because it does not lose. Hamas, which is as much an idea and a network as an organization, will inevitably survive in some form and retain the ability to reconstitute itself, especially in the emerging context of an open Israeli occupation without competition from more moderate Palestinians.

What has happened since October 7 also offers lessons for potential mediators. Persuasion alone cannot rely on changing the behavior of others, be they friends or foes. Diplomatic efforts must be supported by incentives and sanctions, and sometimes carrots and sticks must be discarded.

In addition, diplomacy cannot succeed if the mediator wants success more than the actors themselves, who must decide for themselves that compromise and agreement are better than continued conflict. When actors conclude otherwise, no amount of mediation, no matter how well-intentioned, can succeed.

Younger generations see Israel as more of a Goliath than a David, more of an oppressor than the oppressed. Anti-Semitism is on the rise. And with the prospect of a two-state solution all but dead, Israel may face a binary choice between being a Jewish state or a democratic one.

The legacy, or more precisely, the legacies of October 7th, does not provide much grounds for optimism. A two-state solution is further away than ever. Such an approach was already difficult to achieve before October 7, but the past year has strengthened Israeli doubts about the desirability and possibility of a safe life next to an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, Israel's response to October 7 strengthened anti-Israeli attitudes among Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and in Israel itself, and increased the appeal of Hamas, which, like its allies in Iran, has no interest in peaceful coexistence with Israel.

The net result is that the future is likely to resemble a “one-state solution”: Israeli control of the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, an expanding settler population, and frequent clashes between Israeli security forces and Hamas in Gaza, as well as Hamas-like militias in the West Bank.

Israel has lost a lot, not only in human lives and economic output, but also in reputation and standing in the United States and the world. Younger generations see Israel as more of a Goliath than a David, more of an oppressor than the oppressed. Anti-Semitism is on the rise. And with the prospect of a two-state solution all but dead, Israel could face a binary choice between being a Jewish state or a democratic one. The weakening of Hezbollah and the Houthis, however welcome, does not change these realities.

Israel has also paid a price in the region. Iran achieved one of its initial goals of the attack: making it difficult to establish formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia, a powerful power in the Arab and Islamic world, and Israel. Although condemnations of Israel's actions since October 7 will not prevent intelligence and military cooperation with elected Arab governments facing a common threat from Iran, the Saudi Arabian ruler has withdrawn his openness to normalizing relations in the absence of an independent Palestinian state.

The United States has also paid a heavy price since October 7. They have lost their reputation in the Arab world due to their inability to influence Israeli politics and have alienated some Israelis with their criticism and independent moves. Moreover, the US is once again deeply engaged in the Middle East, while its strategic priorities are deterring Chinese aggression in the Asia-Pacific region and countering Russian aggression in Europe. All this surely brings satisfaction to the anti-Western axis made up of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran.

None of this was inevitable. Successive Israeli governments decided to weaken the PU and underestimated the threat posed by Hamas, which seized the opportunity and organized a brutal attack. Israel then responded militarily, not politically. The US has spent most of its diplomatic capital pushing in vain for a cease-fire that neither side wanted. The human, economic and diplomatic cost was enormous, and the region, which was already the most troubled in the world, was left in an even worse state.

The author is chairman emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and senior advisor at Centerview Partners. He was Director of the Policy Planning Division at the US Department of State (2001-03).

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arranged by: A. Š.