Iran and Saudi Arabia apparently continue a cautious rapprochement. After the two long-time rivals first got closer in the spring of last year, with Chinese mediation, they now want to deepen their relationship.
This, among other things, is indicated by the announcement from Iran a few days ago that it will hold a joint naval exercise with Saudi Arabia. The date has not yet been announced.
The visit of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Aragchi, to the Saudi capital, Riyadh, at the beginning of October speaks of the deepening of relations. There, Aragchi met the Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman.
A difficult past
Relations between the two regional powers have been strained for decades, especially since the 1979 Iranian revolution.
The basis of the tension was also a significantly different understanding of the political role of religion: while Iran long after 1979 practiced a social-revolutionary understanding of Islam - and positioned itself as the protector of rebel Shiites in the region - Sunni Saudi Arabia under the royal family still primarily relies on the role of religion today. in preserving power.
Saudi Arabia also lays claim to leadership in the region on Islam and its role as "custodian" of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.
This contradictory understanding came to the fore especially after the Arab Spring of 2011. Riyadh then feared that Iran could promote protest movements in the Arabian Peninsula.
To this day - and for several years - the two states are indirectly opposed in Yemen, despite all the rhetoric of rapprochement.
In Yemen, the radical Shia paramilitary Houthis tried to overthrow the government of Yemeni President Mansour Hadi and brought large parts of the country under their control.
While Iran supported the Houthis, Saudi Arabia fought the rebels at the head of a coalition of mostly Sunni states, which was also supported by the West, especially the US.
Saudi interests
Still, the current rapprochement has several advantages from the Saudi perspective, says Sebastian Sons, an expert on the Gulf states at the Bonn-based think tank Carpo.
He says that in Saudi Arabia, after the Iranian attacks on its oil facilities in 2019, they became aware that they cannot fully rely on the US and that they will have to solve the problems with Iran's neighbors on their own.
In addition, Sons told DW, people in Riyadh see stability in the region as a prerequisite for a successful economy that needs to be freed from its dependence on oil. Regional stability also requires an orderly relationship with Iran, says Sons.
"And finally, Riyadh also wants to finally end the conflict in Yemen, and in particular the shelling of Saudi territory by the Houthis," says Sons. "In that sense, there is hope for Iranian influence on this paramilitary."
But it remains unclear what influence Iran has on the Houthis, said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iran expert at the Berlin Foundation for Science and Policy.
"It seems unlikely to me that Iran can dictate every move of the Houthis." However, both sides, Iran and the Houthis, protect each other's interests. And that can contribute to the continuation of the ceasefire in Yemen," he says.
Iranian concerns
Iran is also pursuing specific interests by moving closer to Riyadh, Azizi told DW. First of all, the country deals with mitigating the consequences of the sanctions imposed on it by the West and the poor economic picture.
"The economic situation has further burdened the reputation of the regime. "The Iranians doubt his ability to effectively govern the country," says Azizi.
Since the government failed to reach an agreement with the West on the nuclear issue, it has been looking for some time for other international contacts, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. "Renewed relations with Saudi Arabia now serve the same purpose," says Azizi.
According to Azizi, Iran is also concerned about security. Even before the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which was achieved with the mediation of China, Tehran watched with concern as Israel systematically expanded its contacts.
From Iran's point of view, Azizi says, the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would be a threat. "In Tehran, they were afraid of an anti-Iran alliance. They wanted to prevent that. "It seems the best way to fight it in Tehran is to lend a hand to Riyadh itself," Azizi said.
At this point, however, the normalization with Israel that Saudi Arabia sought until the Hamas terrorist attack is no longer on the agenda, notes Sons.
A two-state solution has now been declared a prerequisite for such normalization, which is not an option for Israel, at least at the moment.
No "either-or"
However, Saudi Arabia does not want to turn against Israel or give the impression that it is turning away from the West by getting closer to Tehran: "Riyadh does not pursue an either-or policy. The country does not want to be included in any camp, but it strives for strategic autonomy."
In general, Saudi Arabia wants to be perceived as a bridge builder, says Sons. The kingdom, he adds, offers itself as an intermediary that remains in contact with all other actors.
"Qatar also undertakes a similar function. "Although Saudi Arabia has traditionally been more reserved, it now appears to be positioning itself as an actor that keeps the channels of communication open with Tehran," says Sons.
The state, he says, continues on its current course. "The messages of the Americans to the Iranians have already been transmitted through the Saudis. It will be an important part of Saudi regional policy and diplomacy in the future."
Hamidreza Azizi sees it similarly. Improving Iran-Saudi relations could promote long-term stability in the entire region.
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