It may be true that there are no winners in war, but history has shown that warring parties often want to convince the world otherwise.
The end of the 15-month conflict in Gaza could be an exception. The casualties have been so great, the suffering so immense, and Gaza's future so uncertain that few can confidently say that all this has been worthwhile or that it will benefit Israel's security in the long run. The damage to Israel's reputation could last for decades.
In their final interviews and speeches, as they prepared to leave office, it was noticeable that the foreign policy figures of the Biden administration often looked beyond Gaza, while Western diplomats began to focus on the potentially fateful consequences of the war for the wider Middle East.
Even Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s outgoing national security adviser, was uncertain. “What is the outcome of all this? I think it’s too early to make predictions. Even when good things happen, bad things are just around the corner. That’s true in foreign policy, especially in the Middle East,” he said.
Similarly, Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, argued that changes in the Middle East are often not what they seem. He saw, at best, a “historic window of opportunity.” In every country drawn into Israel’s war with Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, as well as in Israel itself, the balance of power has been altered, but not irreversibly transformed.
This also applies to Gaza itself, where, even if a full ceasefire holds, the future is deliberately blurred. Blinken indirectly criticized this uncertainty in his speech to the Atlantic Council this week, saying that he understood the need for Israel’s war but could not support what might be their plan for peace.
As early as May 2024, the Biden administration assessed that Israel had achieved its main objective in Gaza, “ensuring that Hamas cannot commit another atrocity like the one on October 7,” he said, questioning the need for another eight months of conflict.
He highlighted the futility of continuing the war, acknowledging that "Hamas has been able to recruit almost as many new militants as it has lost, which is a recipe for permanent insurgency and perpetual war."
Israel’s security, he argued, must include a credible political horizon for the Palestinians, otherwise Hamas “or something equally abhorrent” will “rise again.” He said the country “must abandon the myth that it can carry out de facto annexation, without cost or consequences for Israeli democracy, its reputation, and its security.” However, he complained that “the Israeli government has systematically undermined the capacity and legitimacy of the only viable alternative to Hamas: the Palestinian Authority.”
If Israel wants the prize of greater security, he added, it lies in achieving greater integration across the region, particularly through normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia. He said that this is ready to be realized, but only if the Palestinians are allowed to live in their own state, not as a “non-people.”
Donald Trump’s return to the White House may have increased the pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire, but not a definite peace. The new US president is not expected to support Blinken’s plan for a reformed Palestinian Authority under UN supervision to govern a unified Gaza and the West Bank. Israel, for its part, will risk a wider vacuum by implementing its decision not to cooperate with UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinians, and other non-governmental organizations.
There is also no certainty that Palestine will have the quality leadership needed to assume full administrative control over Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, headed by the aging Mahmoud Abbas, is increasingly hated in the West Bank for failing to overcome its differences with Hamas during talks in Moscow, Beijing and Cairo.
In every country drawn into Israel's war with Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, as well as in Israel itself, the balance of power has been altered, but not irreversibly transformed.
Only by expanding the perspective beyond Gaza can Netanyahu and the Israeli military claim that, by choosing to intensify attacks on Hezbollah and Iranian targets, they changed the course and character of the war. The chain of events that led to the destruction of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon, and then to the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and thus to the loss of Iran’s “crown jewel,” may be sloppy, but it is clearly discernible.
The weakening of Iran is perhaps the biggest regional impact of the Gaza war. Biden made this point this week, arguing that Iran, overall, is “weaker than it has been in decades.” He explained: “Iran’s air defenses are in shambles. Their main ally, Hezbollah, is badly wounded, and while we tested Iran’s willingness to renew the nuclear deal, we kept up the pressure with sanctions. Now the Iranian economy is in dire straits.” A defense strategy built over 35 years around proxy armies has been destroyed in just a few months.
This change had an accelerating effect on Tehran's foreign policy elite. Massoud Pazakhstani, Iran's reformist president, and his strategic advisor Javad Zarif extended numerous olive branches to Trump.
The latest offer came in the form of an interview with NBC, in which Pezeshkian, speaking in English, stated that Iran was ready for honest and honest negotiations with the US.
Iran's divided domestic political scene makes it difficult for Tehran to convey a consistent message to Western countries, and there are currently few diplomats in France, Britain or Germany who are convinced of Iran's offer to negotiate a new nuclear deal. Iran has a reputation for buying time with unsuccessful negotiations.
Moreover, Trump's core team is deeply hostile to Iran. Voices within Israel could suggest bombing Iran's nuclear facilities while its air defenses are weakened.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia expresses its displeasure and argues that national sovereignty cannot be a principle that the West advocates only on NATO borders. Riyadh, which is increasingly becoming a key rallying force in the region, also emphasizes that Israel is mistaken if it thinks it has reshaped the region to its own liking.
Saudi Arabia has condemned Israel for its genocide in Gaza and said it will not normalize relations until a clear path is set towards the establishment of a Palestinian state.
In Lebanon, two years of political paralysis have ended, and the newly elected leadership will listen to, but not be influenced by, Iran-backed Hezbollah. The new prime minister, Nawaf Salam, a former president of the International Court of Justice, has just delivered a landmark ruling - that Israel's occupation of Palestine is illegal and must end within a year. It will be a constant reminder that Israel has unfinished business before international courts.
In Yemen, where a 10-year civil war remains unresolved, hatred of Israel is a unifying factor for the Houthi movement that controls the capital, Sanaa.
In Iraq, Iranian proxy groups continue to wield considerable influence over the Shiite-led government. Syria has a leader with a jihadist past, but he is aware that the state of his country requires him to put the conflict with Israel at the bottom of his list of priorities. His first task is to convince the West that he is not secretly establishing a caliphate. At some point, however, Syria will turn to the issue of Israel’s occupation of its territory.
If Israel does not seek reconciliation, the friendship offered to it by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain will not be unconditional, as Blinken pointed out.
Israel may no longer face the once powerful Iranian axis of resistance, but it is certainly not surrounded by well-wishers.
The West will also feel the profound consequences. Sullivan recalled meeting a constituent in Ohio, with whom he discussed the liberal democratic order, and the man replied: “I don’t like those words.” Many American voters will support Trump’s refusal to drag the United States into conflicts in the Middle East.
In the countries of the global south, the concept of a liberal democratic order is met with ridicule. This is partly because support for Israel raises profound questions about respect for the rules of warfare and their selective application.
For American Democrats, as cable news channels finally enter Gaza and document the devastation, internal questioning will only deepen over why the Biden team tolerated the killings and aid restrictions. Labour in the UK will not be immune to similar questions. The Foreign Office department tasked with assessing whether Israeli attacks have violated international humanitarian law continues to insist that there is insufficient detailed and timely information to reach such a conclusion.
There could be a generational shift in Washington that will eventually weaken Israel’s position. Jack Lew, the strongly pro-Israel outgoing US ambassador to Israel, said: “Generational memories don’t go back to the founding of the state, the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War, or even the Intifada. They start with this war, and you can’t ignore the impact of this war on future policymakers. Joe Biden is the last president of his generation whose memories, knowledge and passion for supporting Israel go back to the founding of the state.”
The article is taken from "The Guardian"
Translation: NB
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