Nuclear talks between the United States (US) and Iran have already entered a technical phase after just two rounds of talks mediated by Oman.
The third round of negotiations, along with separate technical talks, is scheduled for April 26 in Muscat.
The progress has sparked speculation, particularly in Iran, that the administration of US President Donald Trump has dropped demands to dismantle Tehran's nuclear program in favor of limiting it.
But analysts warn it is too early to draw such conclusions. While the move to technical talks may suggest a softening of US demands, analysts say dismantling may still be the primary goal -- or at least a pressure point.
"I never thought dismantling was a credible goal," said Richard Nephew, who was the chief sanctions expert on the U.S. team that reached the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.
"If this is still in the minds of the Trump administration, then the long-term outlook remains bleak."
He noted that technical negotiations also took place during the talks that ultimately led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), even as US demands remained maximalist.
Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), sees the current trajectory not as a concession, but as strategic pressure.
"Trump's Iran doctrine is shaping up to give Iran a choice: Either you dismantle your nuclear program or the US and/or Israel will dismantle it for you," he said.
Is Iran stalling?
Some, especially proponents of dismantling, argue that the Islamic Republic is stalling negotiations to buy time before the return of UN sanctions.
Britain, France and Germany have threatened to activate the JCPOA's "snapback" mechanism -- reinstating UN sanctions on Tehran -- if it fails to reach a deal with the United States by the end of June. However, that mechanism expires in October.
Both analysts agree that Iran sees value in prolonging the process to avoid pressure, evade swift sanctions, or simply buy time.
"There's just some pressure coming to use the time left, because even after the sanctions reimposition mechanism expires, you still have the hostile United States with its national sanctions campaign," Nephju said.
"Iran wants to reach a decent agreement, but will accept lost time -- and delayed military action -- as a consolation prize," he added.
Brodsky offered a harsher view, calling the negotiations a "shield" that Tehran is using to protect its nuclear work from further scrutiny or action.
"Iran only loses if the negotiations fail. The United States, however, does not need negotiations as much as Iran," he said.
What would a good agreement with Iran look like?
Despite skepticism about whether dismantling is still a realistic requirement, analysts agree that a deal limiting Iran's nuclear activities can be credible if it includes key safeguards.
"The JCPOA gives us a lot of advice here. You're going to need three things: verification of the limit, physical constraints so they can't quickly exceed that limit, and a credible risk of consequences if they cheat," Nephju said.
He noted that while Iran is unlikely to destroy its advanced centrifuges again, as it did under the 2015 deal, "there is still room to find an agreement."
Brodsky, however, doubts that any agreement short of complete dismantlement can truly prevent Iran from using its nuclear program as leverage.
He sees even low levels of enrichment -- such as the 3,67 percent limit under the JCPOA -- as a threat.
"Its right to enrich uranium to 3,67 percent under the JCPOA was part of the extortion," he said, referring to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
"The continuation of this negotiation process leads some observers to believe that the United States has recognized Iran's right to enrich uranium. I believe that the Trump administration is still defining the contours of what an acceptable deal would look like," Brodsky said.
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