What makes a good NATO ally? Debates about burden-sharing have “rocked and turned” the alliance since its founding in 1949, says Rafael Los of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank. More recently, U.S. President Donald Trump, in both his first and current terms, has rightly criticized Europeans for not paying their fair share while America takes care of everything.
His words resonated, even among those who are lagging behind. Belgium’s defense minister promised to end “a period of national shame” during which the country “was not loyal to its founding status as a NATO member but acted as the most notorious parasite within the entire alliance.” Even Iceland, which has no armed forces, is considering ways to be a “good ally.”
To put the picture into perspective, it is necessary to consider three key elements: how much money is being allocated, what the money is being spent on, and how much the Allies are engaged in joint missions. Let’s start, as politicians usually do, with the money. At first glance, there is much to commend. All but ten of NATO’s 32 members are meeting the current target of spending 25 percent of GDP on defense, compared with XNUMX defaulters a decade ago. Italy and Spain, which are among the lowest spenders in the alliance, have pledged to reach that target this year.
But that's where the good news mostly ends. The two percent target is considered outdated, and the summit starting on June 24 in The Hague is expected to adopt a new target of 3,5 percent of GDP, with an additional 1,5 percent for supporting infrastructure. Moreover, focusing solely on percentages is not a good way to measure combat readiness. Member states have long been “inflating” their figures by including budget items that have little to do with defense.
A better indicator of contribution is what the money is actually spent on. NATO requires members to allocate at least 20 percent of their military budgets to equipment. Virtually all members meet that criterion, although the limit is expected to be raised to one-third at the summit. But even here, numbers don’t tell the whole story—what matters is whether the equipment serves the purpose of collective defense. Take Greece, for example. Last year, it spent 36 percent of its military budget on equipment, among the highest percentages. But much of that money is directed at countering Turkey, another NATO member, not Russia.
The alliance has long tried to influence what equipment its members buy through the NATO Defense Planning Process. Through this mechanism, allies agree on the acquisition of equipment in line with the alliance’s operational needs. But two decades of fighting jihadists have disrupted that process. Many members have invested in a variety of systems, without much coordination.
The threat from Russia has now refocused the focus. “Rather than building forces for different potential scenarios on multiple fronts,” allies will be called upon to “primarily focus” on deterring Russia, write Angus Lapsley and Admiral Pierre Vandier, two NATO officials responsible for the new planning cycle.
It is not yet clear what the division of tasks will look like. NATO is expected to adopt new “capability goals” in June, which will determine what equipment each member will be asked to provide. Priority will likely be given to areas where America has traditionally dominated but could now retreat — such as intelligence gathering, deep strikes or strategic transport. More than three-quarters of members have already agreed to the new plans, including “those that would not normally accept them,” Vandier noted.
Instead of building forces for different potential scenarios on multiple fronts, allies will be called upon to "primarily focus" on deterring Russia
NATO is considering greater specialization. The head of NATO’s Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Dragone, has called for a “multi-speed” approach, in which larger armed forces would take on the main burden of power projection towards Russia, while smaller states would focus on more modest but achievable tasks such as logistics or cybersecurity. This is already happening to some extent.
Luxembourg, with just 900 troops, is a key point in providing satellite communications from space and contributes to NATO's spy plane program. Iceland operates an air defense and surveillance system. But convincing stubborn countries like Spain and Italy could be harder. Planners could play to their strengths by asking them to invest more in naval assets.
When it comes to actual operational engagements, NATO has reason to be optimistic. Even the most stingy allies are contributing. On the eastern flank, Spain commands a brigade-sized multinational contingent in Slovakia, and Italy in Bulgaria. Portuguese fighter jets help patrol the skies over the Baltics. Almost every small member, from Croatia and Albania to Slovenia, contributes troops to NATO's eastern flank.
The more pressing question is whether these limited commitments will be reinforced. In the event of a major war in the east, NATO wants to be able to muster about 100.000 troops within ten days, a significant jump from the 40.000 it currently plans. It also wants to increase its troop numbers by another 200.000 within 30 days. Without American troops, the Europeans will have a hard time preparing to meet those goals unless they invest significantly more in recruiting. In the end, money may still be the key.
Translation: A. Š.
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