CIA vs. Pentagon

Donald Trump's return to the White House initially seemed like a sign of a purge of the intelligence community. However, at a time of rising international tensions, the growing role of covert operations and advanced technologies does not allow him to marginalize the CIA in favor of the Pentagon.

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Photo: Shutterstock
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

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From its inception, immediately after World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headquartered in Langley, Virginia, expanded its sphere of influence at the expense of neighboring agencies: first the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from which it took away its responsibility for espionage in Latin America, and then the State Department's Intelligence Bureau, weakened by the McCarthyist purges of the 1952s. However, it developed its most pronounced antagonism towards the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Department of Defense. On paper, the line had been clear since XNUMX, with the creation of the National Security Agency (NSA), under the auspices of the Pentagon: the human intelligence network belonged to the CIA, and electromagnetic interception and conventional operations to the military.

In practice, however, the border was always porous. Under the pretext of “psychological warfare,” the CIA acquired a wealth of paramilitary experience, in Cuba, Iran, Congo, Laos, Chile, Afghanistan… During the Vietnam War, irritated by covert operations in South Vietnam and Laos, the Pentagon created its own human intelligence network agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in 1961, to break Langley’s monopoly and challenge his overly pessimistic assessments of the effects of military escalation.

The CIA and the military also differ in their conception of intelligence: for the former, it is a diplomatic and strategic tool, for the latter, operational support. This difference also reflects the social base of the two institutions. Langley cherishes a patrician tradition, recruiting its staff from the university elite and large law firms on Wall Street. It also maintains old ties with multinational companies and oil giants, whose armed wing it often served, as in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. The military, on the other hand, remains a vehicle for the rise of the middle class: while the CIA remains predominantly white, more than 30% of active military personnel are members of ethnic minorities. It trains officers in free military academies, and upon retirement, they often become involved in the management of large companies, especially in the field of armaments, which are dependent on state orders.

Hawks from "Team B"

Each side has its own think tanks and channels of influence: for the CIA, these are the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Council on Foreign Relations, the center of liberal internationalism that publishes the journal Foreign Affairs; for the Department of Defense, these are the Armed Services Committees (in the Senate and the House of Representatives) and the RAND Corporation. Beneath the bureaucratic bickering, two visions of American hegemony are hidden: conventional power projection and the arms race at the Pentagon; destabilization operations and “small peripheral wars” at the CIA. This opposition fed conflicts in analysis: under President Gerald Ford (1974–1977), Henry Kissinger, a key figure in the intelligence apparatus and the creator of the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, signed the first agreements on limiting nuclear arsenals. The Pentagon hawks then imposed counter-expertise on the idyllic CIA reports, which could have jeopardized their budget funds, and they were able to establish an independent group within Langley itself – “Team B”.

The end of the counterinsurgency paradigm, inaugurated by September 11, heralded a new balance of power. With the rise of China and the return of Russian power, Cold War paradigms are once again coming to the fore.

The end of the Cold War did not bring a reduction in tensions. During the First Gulf War (1990–1991), the CIA criticized the belligerence of the military leadership and advocated diplomacy and economic sanctions; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, criticized the agency for providing poorly usable field data, too focused on strategic analysis. President George H.W. Bush (1989–1993), who had been a member of Team B before becoming CIA director, sided with the military. The 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” memorandum, written by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, also a veteran of Team B, transformed the Pentagon into a foreign policy punching gun. Although the leak of the document to the New York Times forced the White House to back down, the essence was adopted the following year by the Bill Clinton administration (1993–2001), which expanded the Pentagon's covert operations — deploying special forces in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia — while reducing the CIA to auxiliary tasks, such as searching for targets for aviation.

This unconventional use of troops has drawn criticism in Washington. “If we continue to scatter our forces all over the world on ‘nation-building’ missions, we are going to have serious problems. I will oppose that,” declared Republican candidate George W. Bush during the 2000 presidential campaign. The attacks of September 11, 2001, swept aside these considerations: after several years of lull, the veterans of Team B are returning triumphantly to the top of the state — Richard Cheney as Vice President of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz as his deputy. If the beginning of the war in Afghanistan had seemed like a moment of “sacred unity,” with the joint deployment of the CIA and special forces, Iraq is opening up a new rift. Rumsfeld, Kissinger’s great rival since the XNUMXs, accuses the CIA of stalling in finding “evidence” to justify the invasion, which had already been decided in advance in the White House and the Pentagon.

During Barack Obama's presidency (2009–2017), the rivalry shifted to the use of drones for targeted killings. The administration officially closed the CIA's secret prisons, but intensified the program of remote executions, especially in Pakistan, where, due to the lack of a formal declaration of war and the clear presence of Al Qaeda, the military (theoretically) had no right to intervene. Langley has a technical advantage over the Pentagon: as a pioneer in the use of light drones for reconnaissance, it participated in the development of the Predator model, tested in the XNUMXs in Yugoslavia, and which would remain a reference for the next two decades.

Trump's strategic choices suggest that he has adopted one constant of American power: it wins only in conflicts it does not declare and where it finds allies or mercenaries to fight in its name.

The emergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen allowed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to decide on bombings themselves, but repeated failures and civilian casualties forced the White House to hand the initiative back to the CIA. For example, at a secret base in Saudi Arabia, the agency organized the execution of Imam Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origin, by drone and without trial. The toll of this “scalp race” was heavy: almost three thousand drone strikes during Obama’s two terms — mostly targeting low-ranking fighters — and hundreds of civilian casualties that the CIA, unlike the Pentagon, was not required to report. The two institutions even clashed indirectly on the ground: in early 2016, the Los Angeles Times reported on armed clashes between Syrian rebel groups, some of which were supported by the CIA, others by the Pentagon…

The end of the counterinsurgency paradigm, inaugurated by 11/XNUMX, heralded a new balance of power. With the rise of China and the return of Russian power, Cold War paradigms are once again coming to the fore. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, Washington is accelerating arms deliveries to Kiev, while maintaining diplomatic channels with Moscow, and operating from secret bases without deploying regular troops. A similar strategy is emerging in the South China Sea.

Long reserved for Pentagon strategists and major arms manufacturers, who have provided Taiwan with nearly $50 billion in US arms since 1950, this space is now witnessing a shift in the way war is waged. The conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen — dominated by semi-improvised drones that cost less than $1.000, while the price of a Coyote interceptor missile reaches $100.000 — have shaken the supremacy of conventional weapons systems. Faced with the prospect of a Chinese invasion, a consensus is forming in Taipei around the “jinx” (or “prickly hedgehog”) tactic: the goal is no longer to destroy a superior adversary, but to slow its advance with a multitude of coastal obstacles and the deployment of autonomous systems to compensate for the lack of manpower on the ground.

This orientation towards asymmetric warfare challenges the doctrine of the Ministry of Defense based on the purchase of tanks and aircraft, and increases the importance of the expertise of the CIA. The rise of disruptive technologies (autonomous systems, lasers, quantum computing) and the increasing role of software in the military sphere give tech giants new leverage within the armed forces. And as with drones twenty years ago, Langley has gained an advantage here: since the late 1990s, it has been present in Silicon Valley, where the agency, through its investment fund In-Q-Tel, has been financing the development of “dual” technologies — both civilian and military. Its structure as a non-profit corporation allows it to avoid parliamentary control, significantly protecting its partners. Today, In-Q-Tel claims to have helped eight hundred companies, thirty-two of which are among the hundred most important startups in the field of defense.

Once dominant in the field of applied scientific research, the Pentagon found itself squeezed by the emergence of Silicon Valley and its culture of “disruptive innovation.” Relations deteriorated further after the Edward Snowden affair (2013). The revelations by this former CIA employee, then a Pentagon contractor through the NSA, about the extent of government surveillance programs struck a chord with the “liberal-libertarian” sensibilities of engineers and IT developers. In 2018, Google withdrew from a military drone project under pressure from employees. But since Donald Trump’s reelection, the wind has turned in the other direction: the massive use of drones and facial recognition technology in Ukraine and Gaza — and the revenues it opens up for a technology industry that has been weakened by Asian competition — have removed previous reservations. In early 2024, OpenAI, the creator of ChatGPT, deleted from its charter provisions prohibiting the military use of its technologies. This year, Google followed suit, while Meta partnered with combat drone manufacturer Anduril to develop virtual reality systems for military training.

The Pentagon is trying to catch up by recruiting from Silicon Valley champions (Meta, Palantir, Anduril), many of whom are affiliated with In-Q-Tel. Palantir’s meteoric success best illustrates Langley’s strategy of conquest: founded in 2003 with initial funding from In-Q-Tel, the company has since won mega-contracts for data processing for multinational companies, but also for public institutions in the US and abroad, such as the French Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) (French secret service, ed. transl.) or the British National Health Service (NHS). Palantir is also a partner of the Israeli army: its Tel Aviv branch provides facial recognition services for identifying targets in the occupied territories. The company, which this summer signed a $10 billion contract with the US Department of Defense, has just entered the "top 20" of American companies, overtaking traditional industrial giants such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman or General Dynamics (known in Washington jargon as primes) in terms of market capitalization.

The rise of these new players is also creating tensions within the Pentagon itself. While Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll recently said he would consider the bankruptcy of a prime supplier during his tenure a victory, William LaPlante, the previous administration’s acquisition chief, scoffed at the technophile euphoria in 2022: “If someone tells you a nice story about a project [for the military of the future], ask them when it’s going to go into production, how much it’s going to cost, and what value it’s going to have in a conflict with China. I don’t care if it’s artificial intelligence or quantum technology.”

The utopia of a robot army

The growth of military budgets in Europe and Japan could bring a consolation prize to the Pentagon's traditional suppliers of expensive equipment. The US arsenal already accounts for 80% of the European Union's military imports, but those imports are expected to grow further in line with Trump's demands. Lockheed Martin has announced an increased presence on the continent, through partnerships in the production of conventional weapons, such as Germany's Rheinmetall for the F-35 aircraft and GMARS missile systems, while keeping the most advanced technologies in the US.

Behind the utopia of an army of drones and autonomous robots lies an obsession with cost-cutting. After promising to cut the military budget by 25%, Trump has proposed to Congress a $2026 trillion plan for XNUMX — a larger budget, but one that suggests that technological investments will be financed at the expense of human and operational resources. If its promoters are to be believed, artificial intelligence is reducing the need for soldiers, but subcontracting will remain the main way to secure vital resources and infrastructure around the world, crucial to American economic growth. The Wall Street Journal last month reported on the return to good graces of Erik Prince, the failed private security magnate and longtime Trump ally. In the midst of the ongoing conflict with Rwanda, Prince has won a contract with the Democratic Republic of Congo to protect mining revenues, even offering to let President Felix Tshisekedi hire Salvadoran mercenaries to guard his residence.

Will Trump be not a “president of peace,” as he claims, but — like almost all his predecessors — a president of secret wars? His strategic choices suggest, in any case, that he has adopted one constant of American power: it wins only in conflicts that it does not declare and where it finds allies or mercenaries to fight in its name.

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