When Israel launched its attacks on Iran in the early hours of June 13, many media outlets praised the skill and ingenuity of its intelligence services, which enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to carry out such precise strikes. However, one element was not discussed in detail: Israel's network of relationships with intelligence agencies of other countries and their contribution to these covert operations.
This cooperation, while crucial, comes at a price. It necessarily involves a certain degree of reliance on other states. Intelligence partners can decide to end cooperation at any time, leaving Israel vulnerable to geopolitical upheavals that could threaten those relationships and limit its capacity for precision strikes.
Military interventions against Iran in June, carried out with surgical precision, rounded off a series of successes against its regional adversaries. These included a pager attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the assassinations of senior Hamas officials, including its political leader Ismail Haniyeh, in Iran in July 2024.
All three Israeli security agencies participated in the operations: Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency; Shin Bet, the domestic intelligence agency; and Aman, Israel's military intelligence service.
According to reports from specialized journalists, impressive technological advances have been made. Among them is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze and connect millions of pieces of data in order to identify targets. Israeli intelligence analysts have also used spyware to hack into the phones of the bodyguards of Iranian leaders.
Amman and Mossad also proved adept at recruiting commandos from local opposition groups, who were then used to disable Iranian air defense systems in the early hours of the first day of the attack.
Israeli intelligence services are also very good at showing off their successes. All of this contributes to their reputation. However, these successes are often achieved with the help of intelligence provided to them by friendly services.
This is nothing new, as I discovered during research for my recent book on “Operation Wrath of God.” It was a campaign of retaliation that followed the assassination of members of the Israeli Olympic team by the organization Black September at the 1972 Summer Games in Munich.
While researching at the Swiss National Archives, I came across a large collection of encrypted cables exchanged within a network called Kilowatt. This network involved 18 countries that shared information about the movements of certain Palestinians designated as terrorists, including details of safe houses and vehicles they used.
The Mossad was part of the Kilowatt network and used intelligence it received from its European partners to plan and carry out targeted assassinations across Europe. There is ample evidence in the cables that Western governments knew what the Mossad was using this information for.
The United States has historically been one of Israel's closest intelligence partners. According to research by Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman and American journalist Jefferson Morley, an expert on the CIA, this cooperation in intelligence sharing dates back to the early 1950s.
There are numerous instances in which Israel has sought American assistance in carrying out targeted assassinations. This relationship continues today. The most recent example occurred immediately after Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, when US intelligence sent a special unit to assist the IDF in the Gaza war and established intelligence-sharing channels with Israel to locate top Hamas commanders.
Mossad has also collaborated with Arab intelligence services for years. Meir Dagan, director of Mossad from 2002 to 2011, established an extremely effective regional spy network during his tenure. Bergman documented how this network allowed the Israeli intelligence community to significantly expand its operational reach. This allowed Mossad and Amman to identify, track, and strike targets in Lebanon and Syria.
These relations work despite the fact that Arab countries often publicly condemn Israeli governments' actions at the United Nations. For example, the Washington Post recently reported that Arab states have actually expanded their security and intelligence cooperation with Israel.
While publicly speaking of the “genocide” in Gaza, countries like Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were simultaneously sharing intelligence. This relationship included cooperation with the Five Eyes alliance - the intelligence partnership of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
According to documents obtained by reporters, the partnership, which the US called the “Regional Security Construct,” was established in 2022 and continued to operate even after Israel launched a military operation in Gaza. However, an Israeli attack on Qatar in early September, carried out in an attempt to eliminate senior Hamas representatives who were meeting there, threatened to undermine the partnership.
The anger of Gulf states following the attack is believed to have been a key factor in the US increasing pressure on Israel to agree to a Gaza deal. Cooperating to counter the regional threat from Iran is one thing, while threatening the security of Qatar, an important player and key US ally in the Gulf, is quite another.
Israel's often-vaunted intelligence capabilities have always relied to some extent on the assistance of friendly services. That is unlikely to change. The key question now is to what extent Israel will be able to retain the trust of its secret allies. As history has shown, even in an environment of condemnation and isolation, intelligence cooperation with Israel has remained intact.
Strong intelligence ties have often helped to weather moments of crisis. Informal intelligence-sharing agreements with regional powers, kept strictly secret, with the possibility of plausible deniability and minimal documentation, are therefore of particular importance now as the region seeks to heal the wounds of two years of bitter conflict.
The author is a lecturer in strategy and intelligence studies at Aberystwyth University.
Translation: A.Š.
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