The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a resolution on November 20 calling on Iran to cooperate “fully and immediately.” In particular, the agency wants to investigate the approximately 400 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium still in storage.
Since the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June, Tehran has not allowed IAEA inspectors access to the facilities that were targeted by the attacks.
While the dispute continues, Moscow is expanding its nuclear cooperation with Tehran. “Our cooperation has reached an unprecedented level,” the Russian ambassador to Tehran, Alexei Dedov, said in mid-November.
According to the Iranian news agency ISNA, Dedov stressed that Moscow is helping Tehran in seeking solutions to problems related to its nuclear program and that it will continue with that support.
Moscow and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in late September to build new nuclear power plants. Russia's atomic energy agency Rosatom has signed a $25 billion (€21,4 billion) deal with Iran's Iran Hormoz to build four new nuclear power plants in Iran.
"Russia is the most important international partner for Iran's nuclear program," Middle East expert David Jalilvand writes for DW. He heads the Berlin-based research consultancy Orient Matters, which specializes in the dynamics between geopolitics, economics and energy in Iran and the Middle East.
"However, he acknowledges that, when it comes to further expanding Iran's nuclear program, Moscow has promised much and delivered little."
The construction of a second reactor in Bushehr was announced back in 2016. However, this has not been implemented to date. He believes that it is unlikely that the new intention will quickly turn into action: "Russia has little interest in strengthening Iran's strategic position in the Middle East, both because of its relations with Israel, the Gulf states and Turkey."
Twelve-Day War: Russian aid missing
During the recent 12-day war, Tehran received little support from Moscow. And earlier this year, Russia and Iran signed a strategic partnership agreement, which envisages military and economic cooperation for the next 20 years.
Tehran supplied drones and weapons for Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine, thereby becoming one of Moscow's most important allies - to the detriment of its relations with Europe.
In return, Iran ordered, among other things, several Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets to modernize its air force. However, these aircraft were not delivered until the most recent military conflict with Israel. The war clearly exposed the weaknesses of Iran's air defenses.
"The strategic agreement with Russia has turned out to be a farce," criticized Mohamad Sadr, a member of the Arbitration Council - in Persian, "Assembly for Recognizing the Interests of the System."
“Russia cannot be trusted: to believe that it would come to our aid or confront the US is absurd.” Sadr even accused Moscow of providing Israel with information about Iranian defense centers.
In Iranian society, the image of Russia is accordingly negative. A professor at Tehran University explains to DW: "People know that Russia lets Iran down at crucial moments. Many are convinced that the government is only clinging to Moscow to preserve power, not in the interests of the population."
Calculation behind the partnership
Despite the lessons of the 12-day war, conservative forces in Iran are demanding further deepening of cooperation. "Russia's influence in Iran's power centers is undeniable," Afshar Soleimani, a former Iranian ambassador to Baku, told DW.
"Conservative forces support Russia, the delivery of Iranian drones to Moscow, and the ongoing tensions with the US. This shows how strong this influence is. As long as this political current is in power, little will change – and the population will bear the consequences."
Kamran Gazanfari, a conservative member of the Iranian parliament's Internal Affairs Committee, even claims that former Russian President and current deputy head of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, stated that Russia is ready to supply Iran with nuclear weapons.
But expert Jalilvand considers such a prospect unlikely: "Russia has no interest in expanding the circle of nuclear powers in the already unstable Middle East."
It is possible, however, that Moscow could supply technologies that Tehran could theoretically use for its military program; but direct support for the construction of a nuclear bomb is considered out of the question.
Russia is using the "Iran card" primarily as part of its negotiating strategy towards the US. Although Tehran has, according to its own statements, temporarily suspended uranium enrichment, it remains open whether Moscow can force Iran to reduce its uranium stockpile.
"Russia has repeatedly asserted itself as a mediator in the past," says Middle East expert David Jalilvand. "However, this is probably not motivated by an interest in resolving the nuclear conflict. Rather, Moscow, given the war in Ukraine, is trying to position itself as an allegedly constructive partner towards the United States and thereby drive a wedge between Washington and Europe."
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