For more than two decades, Russia has woven itself into Venezuela's military and energy sectors, as well as the political elite, courting Hugo Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro, fierce critics of the US, and establishing a firm foothold in the Western Hemisphere.
During President Vladimir Putin's 26 years in power, Russia has cultivated personal relationships, institutional ties and commercial interests. Analysts say that, despite the US arrest of Maduro, these ties are unlikely to disappear overnight.
"Their dismantling would be expensive and complex," independent analyst Alexandra Sitenko from Berlin told RFE/RL.
The ties extend to Venezuela's interim leadership. Delcy Rodriguez, who served as vice president under Maduro, has long maintained close relations with Moscow.
Putin awarded Rodriguez the Russian state decoration, the Order of Friendship, in 2024, and Moscow has also publicly expressed its support for her as interim leader.
"Delsi Rodriguez is someone the Russians know and can work with," wrote Mark Galeotti, a Russia analyst and emeritus professor at the School of Slavic and East European Studies at University College London, in a January 7 blog post for the British media outlet iNews.
The question now is how long Russia can realistically maintain its presence. Moscow's ability to exert influence in the near future is limited, analysts say, and opposing the United States could be counterproductive.
"There's no reason not to try"
As time passes since the surprise US capture of Maduro in a night raid on January 3, the Kremlin appears to be taking stock of the situation. Ten days later, Putin has made no public statement.
"Moscow has no reason not to try to remain a player in Venezuela," Paul Goble, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, told RFE/RL. "But it is unlikely to assume a prominent role anytime soon, as the US would likely respond in a way that would hurt Russia more."
Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine may limit its ability and desire to take on such a role.
"It seems more likely that Russia will instead focus its efforts on trying to deter further US seizures of sanctioned oil tankers like the Bela-1/Mariner, given the importance of the global phantom fleet to its economy and war machine," Henry Ziemer, a fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFE/RL.
On January 7, US naval forces seized the tanker "Bela 1" in the North Atlantic, which was recently renamed "Marinera" and was sailing under the Russian flag.
It was a blow to Russia's use of a fleet of shadowy ships to transport sanctioned energy products.
Russian criticism of the move has been muted, although Zimmer said he would expect more Russian military threats of retaliation if the US seizes additional tankers, including a potential nuclear show of force.
"If it succeeds in reducing US law enforcement measures, it could indirectly ease the pressure on the remaining Chavista structures in Venezuela," he said, referring to the legacy of Chavez, who died in 2013 and chose Maduro as his successor. "But I don't expect overt Russian efforts to influence Venezuelan internal politics."
Everything revolves around oil?
Another key question is whether Russia can maintain its oil interests in Venezuela, which has the world's largest proven oil reserves, and since Moscow has invested billions of dollars in the sector over the past two decades.
"Russia could try to claim that the property is legally protected Russian property," Vladimir Ruvinsky, a professor of political studies at the University of Isisi in Cali, Colombia, told RFE/RL.
Moscow took a step in that direction on January 13: State-owned Roszarubezhneft said that the oil assets it is developing in Venezuela belong to Russia and that it intends to continue operating there.
US President Donald Trump, however, has indicated that Washington intends to control oil sales in Venezuela. He said on January 9 that the US would sell China and Russia "all the oil they need" as his administration tries to take control of Venezuelan oil exports.
"The White House's rhetoric... suggests that it will seek preferential access to oil sector opportunities for American companies and will likely reject Russia's claims to oil infrastructure," Zimmer told RFE/RL.
Shortly after its founding in 2020, Roszarubezhneft acquired Venezuelan oil assets from Russian state-owned giant Rosneft after the US imposed sanctions on two Rosneft subsidiaries for trading Venezuelan oil.
The company has the second-largest foreign stake in Venezuela's oil sector after China's Sinopec, which has rights to about 2,8 billion barrels, according to data published by Bloomberg News.
At the same time, Rosneft – headed by close Putin ally Igor Sechin who cultivated close ties with Venezuela, especially under Chavez – still has an office in Caracas, which, according to Sitenko, means it has not given up hope of eventually returning to the country.
Moscow's military heritage
Beyond the hydrocarbon industry, Zimmer said: "I would not rule out the possibility that the US would allow, for example, Russian private companies to continue selling their products in Venezuela or Russian companies to do business in a sector that is not related to oil or defense."
Russia has been Venezuela's main arms supplier for years, providing air defense systems, aircraft, and light weapons.
In October, as Washington deployed forces to the Caribbean while considering military options related to what it said was a counter-narcotics campaign, Maduro claimed that Venezuela had about 5.000 Russian Igla-S anti-aircraft missiles deployed at "key air defense positions."
Around the same time, the Russian service RFE/RL and other media outlets reported on possible deliveries of Russian air defense components, including the Pantsir-S system.
Soldiers in the field?
On January 10, the Russian ambassador to Venezuela suggested on Russian state television that Venezuela's Russian air defenses were ineffective during the US operation to capture Maduro, citing "serious problems" with communication between elements of the system.
Citing unnamed US officials, The New York Times reported on January 12 that the S-300 and Buk M-2 air defense systems were not linked to radars when the US strike occurred, adding detail to Ambassador Sergei Melik-Bagdasarov's claims.
One unresolved issue is the fate of about 100 Russian military personnel sent to Venezuela in 2019, for what Moscow said was a training and advisory mission, at a time of U.S.-backed challenges to Maduro's rule.
There was no official confirmation of their withdrawal. Ruvinsky told RFE/RL that he "hadn't heard about a Russian military presence in Venezuela for a long time," adding: "If there were even 100 Russians there, the local Russian community would know."
A possible explanation for Russia's relatively mild reaction to the US arrest of Maduro and the seizure of the tanker is, as evidence suggests, the Kremlin's long-standing desire for an understanding whereby Russia would accept US dominance in the Western Hemisphere in exchange for freedom in what Moscow considers its sphere of influence, particularly in Ukraine.
"I think Russia is taking a break now to see how this plays out," Ruvinsky said.
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