Why is Xi Jinping failing to eradicate corruption?

After securing a landmark third term as Communist Party general secretary in October 2022, Xi Jinping led senior party officials on a pilgrimage to the “red holy city.” His choice was Yan’an, in northwest China, where Mao Zedong’s guerrillas once had bases. The destination was a harbinger of Xi’s priorities in the years to come. He told his aides that Yan’an was where the party built its fighting spirit and committed itself to “the correct political direction.”

But Yanan’s legacy also has a dark side. It was there, in the early 1940s, while surrounded by Japanese and Nationalist forces, that Mao launched the party’s first major “rectification” campaign, crushing rivals and further consolidating his grip on power. What began as mandatory study of Mao’s teachings quickly turned into a paranoid purge: of the estimated 40.000 revolutionaries then in the area, 15.000 were declared traitors. Torture was common, and many were executed or forced to commit suicide.

When Xi talks about promoting the “Yanan spirit,” he is not advocating a similar bloody showdown—Mao’s orgiastic period of violence has no place in the official mythology of the region. Yet the invocation of Yanan is aimed at ideological purity, including the rejection of corrupt and hedonistic behavior. Xi has waged a relentless war on corruption since coming to power in 2012, imprisoning thousands of officials and punishing millions more. He calls the process the party’s “self-revolution,” which involves “turning the blade in on itself.”

The latest targets, according to reports published on January 24, are two elite generals, including the armed forces' highest-ranking uniformed officer, Zhang Youxia. They are part of a long line of generals that Xi has removed in recent years, leaving the military's top brass seriously depleted.

Xi promised at the start of his term to build a party in which officials “must not, cannot, and do not want to be corrupt.” Indeed, ordinary citizens testify that he has reduced the open, street-level corruption that was rampant under previous leaders. Still, in 2025, authorities investigated more than a million people for corruption and political indiscipline—more than in any previous year of his rule. During the same year, 983.000 people were punished. The number of investigations launched was at least 15 percent higher than in 2024 and as much as 60 percent higher than in 2023.

More than seven years ago, Xi declared a “conclusive victory” in the war on corruption. But in January last year, he admitted that the party had not yet brought the problem under control. “Even under strong pressure, some still dare to act recklessly,” wrote the People’s Daily, the official party newspaper.

The army as a hotbed of corruption

Let’s first look at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as China’s armed forces are officially called, which numbers about two million members. The PLA is the party’s army, and Xi is its supreme commander. Yet strong networks of personal loyalty, the ability to operate covertly, and control over vast resources have traditionally made the military fertile ground for corruption. Huge budget increases and massive equipment purchases over the past two or three decades have opened up new opportunities for abuse.

All units have political commissars, whose duty is to monitor corruption while ensuring the ideological indoctrination of soldiers in Xi's thought. However, their supervision is often lukewarm.

Bribery remains a serious problem in the military. According to the Wall Street Journal, senior officers familiar with the investigation into General Zhang were told that he allegedly helped promote former Defense Minister Li Shangfu in exchange for a large bribe. Li was dismissed and stripped of his general rank after disappearing from public view in 2023, just months after taking office.

Last year, the Berlin-based MERIKS think tank said recent purges in the PLA indicated that Xi's early attempts to crack down on corruption in the military had failed. "Ranks and promotions were routinely sold, and corruption was widespread," their report said.

“Help me climb up”

Buying promotions is also widespread among civilian officials. In 2024, the director of the state fire department was convicted of selling jobs to his subordinates. Between 2016 and 2023, a fire chief in the southern city of Beihai paid more than 1,3 million yuan (about $187.000) to advance in the hierarchy.

To raise such funds, some officials sell public procurement contracts or, in the case of the fire department, overlook building code violations in exchange for bribes. They often sell lower-level positions to finance the purchase of higher positions for themselves.

One reason for the surge in investigations is that Xi is now scaling back his campaign. The hunt for “unfit” members has been stepped up across the system, affecting hundreds of thousands of lower-ranking officials, as well as ordinary party members such as entrepreneurs and NGO workers. As a share of the total number of investigations, bribery and corruption offences have risen significantly. Between April and September, an average of 7.271 people were punished per month for giving or receiving money and other valuables. In the same period a decade ago, the number was just 586.

Analysis by Andrew Wedemann of Georgia State University shows that by 2024, almost everyone who was punished for giving or receiving gifts had become corrupt, or had continued illegal actions, after Xi came to power.

This is despite increasingly harsh penalties. In 2014, only about 30 percent of cases ended in prison or expulsion from the party, which effectively means a ban on civil service. The rest went through self-criticism and “political re-education.” Today, more than 70 percent of cases end in severe sanctions.

The number of suspects held without charge, in the hope of pleading guilty, rose by 46 percent in 2024. Such detentions usually involve solitary confinement. Torture is widespread. At least five prominent businessmen committed suicide between April and July after being detained, while others died in custody.

So why take the risk?

In some cases, the surge in investigations has been linked to surges in state spending in strategic sectors, such as chip manufacturing and the military industry. For example, anti-corruption agencies punished more than 60.000 people in the pharmaceutical industry in 2024, while China's biotechnology sector has received strong state support.

But corruption is not always motivated by greed, notes Jonathan Zinn of the Brookings Institution. It is often a matter of self-preservation. Officials often feel compelled to accept money because refusing it could raise suspicions among colleagues that they are informers.

Paradoxically, as one Chinese scholar points out, Xi’s campaign may have deepened a form of “crony politics,” as fearful officials increasingly rely on narrow personal networks. This further reinforces an informal system in which corruption thrives. Gifts, like expensive alcohol, provide a “signal” that the recipient immediately understands that there is a request, even if no one says it out loud. The decision to safely accept or return a gift indicates whether the sender is considered trustworthy. “They would rather do a favor for someone they know well than take a chance with a stranger,” says Qin.

Xi portrays corruption as an existential threat to the party. Whether a local mayor fails to carry out a central order or accepts money from a construction investor, both are interpreted as ideological and moral decline, and ultimately as disloyalty to Xi himself. In his view, it is precisely such people who were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is a history that haunts him deeply and to which he often refers.

The ruthlessness of his anti-corruption campaign has also made him enemies. Last year, a wave of online outrage erupted over arbitrary detentions and deaths in prison. In a speech published in November, Xi rebuked party members who claim the campaign is “damaging the party’s reputation.” On the contrary, he said, “scraping bones to remove poison will not only not damage the party’s reputation and prestige, but will strengthen them.”

There is no doubt that Si expects to spend a lot of time in the operating room.

Prepared by: S. STRUGAR