China and Iran: Interest without emotion

When American and Israeli warplanes attacked Iran this weekend and killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the leading evening news program on Chinese state television reported the matter with unusual frankness. The basic facts were reported clearly and quickly. Compare that to what happened barely two months earlier, when mass protests erupted across the Islamic Republic. For the first two weeks, Chinese broadcasters said nothing. When they finally reported on the unrest, they portrayed the protesters as pawns of “foreign forces.”

This difference reveals one reason why the Chinese leadership is not as alarmed by the current attacks on Tehran as many assume. China was alarmed by the Iranians rising up against their own government in late December. The sight of a popular movement toppling an autocratic regime is precisely what makes officials in Beijing nervous. An airstrike that kills a political leader is, from the Chinese perspective, much easier to control. It is easier to express outrage at the belligerent Americans. It is also possible to imagine different outcomes in Iran that could work in China’s favor.

Some supporters of President Donald Trump in the United States have portrayed Khamenei’s death as a devastating blow not only to the Islamic Republic but also to China itself. Such hasty assessments assume that China has been humiliated. It is true that the country has previously sought to portray itself as a new power broker in the Middle East. Three years ago, it brought Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table to restore diplomatic relations; some observers hailed it as evidence of China’s growing influence in the region. The joint US-Israeli attacks, however, suggest otherwise: China’s influence and ambitions in the Middle East are more limited than previously thought.

As passive as it is in Iran, China similarly stood aside in Venezuela in January, when Trump—with his penchant for violence and showmanship—sent U.S. troops to capture China’s ally, Nicolas Maduro. Of the two, Iran carries the greater weight. Venezuela supplied less than 4% of China’s total crude oil imports, while Iran accounted for more than 10%. Iran has also been a useful thorn in the side of the United States, as its proxy forces have attacked Americans and their allies across the region. So, one could argue that China is the big loser from bombing Iran.

But such an interpretation is more wishful thinking than real analysis. It’s not that China is exactly in despair. First of all, no one knows how a military operation will end. If the United States were to get bogged down in Iran, which is a very real possibility, China would probably watch with hidden pleasure. The US war in Iraq in the early 2000s diverted attention from the competing threat that was then just beginning to emerge from China. Today, that rivalry is much more intense, and such distractions would be even more costly.

Julian Gewirtz, a security official in Joe Biden's administration, notes that even without an Iraq-like scenario, the likelihood that America will have to refocus its attention on the Middle East is an advantage for China. "We only have a certain number of aircraft carriers, we only have a certain amount of presidential time and attention," Gewirtz said.

Besides, China doesn’t need Iran the way Iran needs China. Chinese buyers account for more than 80% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Although Iranian oil is under U.S. sanctions, small Chinese refineries are happy to pass it off as, for example, Malaysian oil. China has also sold Iran key technology, including digital surveillance tools that helped the regime brutally suppress recent protests.

China, however, has concluded that Iran is simply less important. It has a diverse portfolio of oil suppliers, and in any case its huge demand for oil appears to be peaking (although China remains the world’s largest importer of crude), thanks to the boom in electric vehicles. China has also made relatively little direct investment in Iran, despite earlier pledges. Perhaps most significantly, Chinese officials have become wary of Iran’s unpredictability. They view the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons with quiet concern, in part because it could undermine the nuclear taboo that constrains China’s rivals in Asia, especially Japan.

China also has large investments and significant communities of its citizens in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and has not looked favorably on Iranian attacks on those countries. “Despite the narrative of China-West rivalry, China’s closest relationships in the Middle East are mostly with partners and allies of the United States,” says Jonathan Fulton of the Atlantic Council, a US think tank. “China is actually an actor in this part of the world that supports the existing order.”

All of this suggests a rather cold and calculating approach from China. It will not abandon Iran as a partner. But it may not particularly care whether the clerics remain in power or some other constellation of leaders, perhaps from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard, takes over. What China is most interested in are its interests in the Middle East, from stable energy prices to a safe environment for investors. If American actions somehow lead to an Iranian government that truly gives up its nuclear weapons, so much the better. “Whatever happens, the Iranian regime has a lot to think about and fix,” says Ding Long of Shanghai University of International Studies.

China’s restraint probably didn’t surprise Iran. It already knew what to expect. When Israel bombed its nuclear facilities in June 2025, China offered little more than sharp verbal condemnations. In the run-up to the attacks that killed Khamenei, China’s tone was even more restrained. Some Chinese analysts are already considering what comes next. If America eventually lifts sanctions on Iran, Iraq’s experience is instructive: When reconstruction begins, Chinese companies, with their experience in infrastructure, technology and trade, are among the first to emerge. Iran’s oil could flow more freely again. “China could even become one of the winners,” says Ding. “You shouldn’t be overly pessimistic.”

It's a cold calculation, born of the realization that China has enormous economic interests in the Middle East but little ability or will to engage more forcefully in the complex politics of the region. For now, China is a bystander as the bombs fall on Iran. When the reconstruction begins, it will no longer be a bystander.

Translation: NB