Who makes the decisions in Iran?

The question hanging over Tehran since the opening blows in Iran's current war with the United States (US) and Israel is simple: who is in charge?

This is what Amir Azimi, editor of the BBC, writes in his article today.

We transmit the text in its entirety:

Formally, the answer is clear. Mojtaba Khamenei took over the role of supreme leader after his father, Ali Khamenei, was assassinated on the first day of the war, February 28. In the system of the Islamic Republic, this position is supposed to be decisive. The leader has the final say on almost all important issues: war, peace, and the strategic direction of the state.

But in practice, the picture is much more unclear.

Donald Trump has described the Iranian leadership as "divided" and suggested the US is waiting for Tehran to present a "unified proposal".

Unity was certainly on the mind of Iranian leaders when they sent a message to Iranians' mobile phones on Thursday evening stating that in Iran "there is no hardliner or moderate - there is only one nation, one direction."

Invisible leader

Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he took power. Aside from a few written statements, including one in which he insisted that the Strait of Hormuz remain closed, there is little direct evidence of his day-to-day control.

Iranian officials have acknowledged that he was wounded in the initial strikes but have offered few details. The New York Times, citing Iranian sources, reported this week that he may have suffered multiple injuries, including facial injuries that make it difficult for him to speak.

That absence is significant. In Iran's political system, authority is not just institutional—it is also performative. Khamenei's late father sent signals of intent through speeches, carefully measured public appearances, and visible mediation between factions. That signaling function is now largely absent.

The result is a vacuum of interpretation. Some argue that Mojtaba Khamenei's wartime rise simply did not allow him to establish authority on his own terms. Others point to reports of his injuries and question whether he is even capable of actively running the system.

In any case, decision-making appears to be less centralized than before the war.

Diplomatic channels open, but barely

On paper, diplomacy is the responsibility of the government. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi continues to represent Tehran in talks with the US, under Iranian President Masoud Peshmerga.

But none of them seem to be setting the strategy, and their authority is further questioned by the fact that the Iranian delegation is led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.

Aragchi's role appears more operational than directive. His brief retraction of a statement on whether the Strait of Hormuz was open or closed - first suggesting that traffic had resumed, then quickly retracting it - provided a rare glimpse of how little control the diplomatic channel has over military decisions.

Pezeshkijan, meanwhile, has aligned himself with the broader direction of the regime without visibly shaping it. Considered a relatively moderate figure, he has so far avoided advocating an independent line.

The stalled second round of talks with the US in Islamabad further confirms this assessment. Even when diplomatic channels are open, the system seems unable or unwilling to commit.

The army is expanding its powers

Control of the Strait of Hormuz is the most immediate source of Iranian influence. But decisions to close it are made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by Ahmad Vahidi, not by a diplomatic team.

This places real power in the hands of actors operating behind closed doors. Unlike previous crises, there is no single, identifiable figure clearly taking responsibility for strategy. Instead, a pattern emerges: moves first, messages later, and not always consistent ones.

In practice, it is the IRGC's actions, whether in enforcing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or in attacks on targets across the Gulf, that set the pace of the crisis. Political and diplomatic responses often follow, rather than lead.

This does not necessarily mean the collapse of the administrative branches of government. But it does indicate that the IRGC's operational autonomy has expanded, at least temporarily, in the absence of clear political arbitration.

Ghalibaf comes to the fore

Mohamed-Bager Galibaf enters this uncertainty.

A former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, now the speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf has emerged as one of the most visible figures of the moment. He has engaged in negotiations, addressed the public, and at times presented the war in a pragmatic rather than ideological tone.

Within parliament and across conservative networks, resistance to negotiations remains strong.

Hardline rhetoric has intensified, and state media and public campaigns increasingly present negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of the country's enemies.

Ghalibaf's position is therefore precarious - he is active but not clearly authorized. He insists that his moves are in line with the wishes of Mojtaba Khamenei, but there is little visible evidence of direct coordination.

In a system that depends on signals from the top, this ambiguity speaks volumes.

Declared or actual coherence

Taken together, these dynamics indicate a system that is functioning but not coherently directed.

The authority of the supreme leader exists, but is not seen to be exercised. The presidency is aligned, but does not lead. Diplomacy is active, but not decisive. The military holds key levers, but without a clear public architect. Political figures step forward, but without unquestioned legitimacy.

It is not a collapse. The Islamic Republic remains intact. But it points to something more subtle — a system that struggles to translate the influence it wields, such as the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, into a clear strategy in a moment of acute pressure. It can still operate on multiple fronts, but it has difficulty signaling a clear direction to its own centers of power.

And in the Iranian political model, signaling is the way coherence is maintained.

For now, the system is holding the line, maintaining control and avoiding visible disintegration despite increasing pressure. But the question is increasingly being asked whether coherence is actually being enforced or merely claimed declaratively.