The Third Islamic Republic - who holds power in Iran: The Supreme Leader has not yet been seen in public, the president has no power...

For decades, power in Iran was centralized in the hands of one man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But since his assassination at the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, decision-making in Tehran has become increasingly decentralized, experts say.

Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since succeeding his father in early March. In his absence, a group of senior Iranian officials effectively runs the country.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a dominant political player, has now become the decisive force in Iran, experts say. Reformists and moderate politicians have been pushed to the margins, leading to a tougher and more ideologically rigid system.

Key centers of power and personalities have emerged in what some observers call the Third Islamic Republic. While many of these figures agree on major policy measures, some cracks have emerged.

Mojtaba Khamenei: The New Supreme Leader

As supreme leader, the 56-year-old has the final say on all matters of state. But his authority has been undermined from the start.

Khamenei was a controversial choice for supreme leader. The cleric had never held public office, and some argued that a move toward "hereditary rule" would betray the very anti-monarchist roots of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Seriously wounded in an Israeli airstrike that killed his father, Khamenei has not been seen in public since he was appointed on March 8. He suffered injuries to his head, lower back and foot, but is now "fully healthy," Mazahar Hosseini, chief of protocol at the supreme leader's office, said on May 8.

US intelligence agencies have said they believe Khamenei plays a prominent role in war strategy and managing peace talks with the US. Yet in a system where the supreme leader is omnipresent – ​​sending audio messages, giving video addresses and appearing in public to demonstrate his authority – his absence is conspicuous.

"Iran has entered a period of transition following the death of Ali Khamenei and the end of his 36-year leadership," Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington, told Radio Farda (RFE's Iranian service). "This is a challenging period in which the post-war balance of power will be decisive."

Hosein Taeb: Behind the scenes operator

Taeb, a hardline cleric, led the IRGC's intelligence service for 13 years, until 2022, when he was removed as part of major changes to the security system.

Taeb, who is blacklisted by the US and the European Union for his alleged role in state repression, worked in the Supreme Leader's office before being appointed head of the IRGC's intelligence service in 2009.

A longtime confidant of the younger Khamenei, Taeb is considered a key behind-the-scenes figure. Experts say he could play an important role in managing Khamenei's relationships with key players within the system.

Ahmad Vahidi: Head of the IRGC

The IRGC, the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, has always played a key role in politics. However, it is now the dominant political force in the Islamic Republic following the death of Ali Khamenei.

She holds that position despite Israel and the US decimating the IRGC leadership, including the assassination of its supreme commander, Mohammad Pakpour.

Pakpour's deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in early March. But experts say it is unclear whether Vahidi has the clout and credibility to unite the rival factions within the IRGC.

Experts say the war and securitization of Iran after the death of Ali Khamenei have allowed the IRGC to play a central role in the country's domestic and foreign affairs.

"The era after Ali Khamenei remains unclear. However, one key fact is visible: the growing role and power of the IRGC in the administration of the Islamic Republic," Mojtaba Najafi, an Iranian political commentator based in France, told Radio Farda.

"Today, a significant part of the country's administration is in the hands of the IRGC," he added. "Militarization in the economy, politics, culture and society has also now reached a stage of maturity."

Mohamed Baker Kalibaf: Mediator

Qalibaf is a conservative politician and former military commander who has cultivated ties to Iran's top leadership and the IRGC for decades.

After a career overshadowed by corruption scandals and failed presidential bids, he has arguably found himself in the position of the most powerful figure left in the Islamic Republic.

Experts describe the role of Qalibaf, the speaker of parliament who is also Iran's chief negotiator with the US, as a mediator between the different centers of power in Iran. He is considered close to the new supreme leader.

This role was held by Iran's powerful security chief, Ali Larijani, before his assassination in March. Larijani was a unifying figure who brought together opposing political factions and maintained strong ties to the IRGC, the intelligence apparatus, and the clerical establishment.

"Qalibaf was always a pawn (used by the leadership)," Hosein Razak, a political analyst from Germany, told Radio Farda.

"Today, with the elimination of other key pawns, the role he plays for the system has become more prominent," Razak added.

Mohamed Baker Zolkadr: Head of Security

Former IRGC commander Zolqadr succeeded Larijani as head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body.

While Larijani was known as an astute and pragmatic politician, Zolqadr is a hard-line security and military official.

Razak believes the general's appointment is an attempt by Khamenei to divide power among his loyalists. His selection, he said, also underscored the IRGC's dominance in various centers of power in Iran.

Masoud Pezeshkian: A President Without Power

The reformist president is not a major political player and the hardliners who dominate the system do not consider him a threat.

Pezeshkijan's role is administrative, and he runs the day-to-day affairs of the government. However, final decisions on important issues, including war and diplomacy, are made elsewhere.

He and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are the only members of the reformist and moderate political camp who play a visible role in the new power structure. Like Pezeshkian, Araqchi has no decision-making power, but follows orders from above.

However, differences have emerged that pit figures like Pezeshkian and Arakchi, who advocate diplomacy, against generals who oppose concessions to the United States in negotiations to end the war.