Shared risks – why is Europe increasingly turning to the Indo-Pacific?

Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles used harsh words. The seabed has become a "battlefield," he said at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore in late May. Attacks on undersea cables have reached, he said, a scale unprecedented in history.

Indeed, few things today bind Europe and the Indo-Pacific more strongly than concern for infrastructure. It underpins global data transmission, communications and much of the world economy. On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the deployment of unmanned systems to protect this underwater infrastructure.

This debate points to a trend that has long been underestimated: Europe and the countries of the Indo-Pacific increasingly share the same strategic vulnerabilities. The French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) speaks of a new security reality in which the interests of Europe and East Asia are closer than ever before. At the same time, pressure is growing: China continues its military expansion, but also uses trade routes to achieve its geo-economic goals.

Europe does not play a significant role in Asian security policy

The vulnerability is particularly evident when it comes to submarine cables.

"The security of these cables is a global public good," Christian Wirth of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) told DW. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure is a common challenge today, whether the threat comes from Russia in the Baltic Sea or from actors in the Indo-Pacific, the German expert said.

He emphasizes that the incidents must be viewed as a systemic risk that threatens global trade in a broader sense. In this context, the Taiwan Strait is not just a local issue, but, as Wirth states, one of the key factors of global security interests.

The tangible nature of this vulnerability has already been demonstrated repeatedly in the Taiwan Strait. In 2025 alone, several submarine cables were damaged in the waterway that separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan.

In one case last year, Taiwan's coast guard detained a cargo ship after it cut off a vital communication link between Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago, which lies off the Chinese coast but is administered by Taiwan. The ship was flying the flag of the West African country of Togo, while all eight crew members were mainland Chinese citizens.

A Taiwanese court sentenced the captain to three years in prison in 2025. It remains disputed whether the incident was the result of a technical malfunction or deliberate sabotage.

Many security experts consider such incidents to be examples of so-called "gray zone" operations - activities that remain below the threshold of open military conflict.

Mark Saksar, a geopolitics expert at the Bangkok office of the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, believes that Europe must also view the technological and innovative strength of East Asia through the prism of security.

"Freedom of sea routes is a security interest for Germany," Saksar tells DW.

The Malay Strait is particularly important, through which a large part of Germany's supply chains pass. However, he adds that East Asia is beyond Europe's capacity when it comes to projecting security power.

"Therefore, Europe does not play a significant role there in terms of security," he points out.

"Window of vulnerability"

Security issues in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia must be seen as interconnected.

"We are currently witnessing the formation of a world that is fragmenting into three geopolitical conflict zones," Saksar assesses.

If resources are committed in one region, he explains, then they are not available elsewhere.

According to Christian Wirth, European-Indo-Pacific relations are entering a new phase. It is marked by changes in previous American policy that force Washington to shift troops and weapons between various crisis hotspots – from Ukraine to Taiwan and South Korea.

Such dynamics clearly show that the United States is increasingly acting as a stable and reliable guarantor of security for both regions.

The Paris-based European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) also warns that the current situation could further widen Europe's "window of vulnerability."

Diplomacy and industrial reality

The key issue remains cooperation in preserving the international order, believes Saksar.

"The goal is to cooperate with Europe to preserve what is left of the rules-based multilateral order," he says.

However, he adds that for many Asian countries, as well as for countries of the so-called Global South, the world order established after 1945 is no longer acceptable in its current form and that reforms are necessary.

This reveals another tension. While IFRI advocates greater European industrial autonomy and the expansion of defense capabilities, Saksar urges caution and warns of the danger of over-stretching European security policy.

In his opinion, the priority should be challenges within Europe itself.

Wirth, on the other hand, points out that growing doubts about the reliability of American security guarantees further emphasize the need for Europe to develop greater capacities for independent action.

The arms industry also shows that the interdependence of the two regions' security policies goes far beyond diplomatic declarations. In recent years, South Korea has emerged as one of the main suppliers of defense equipment to European countries.

Therefore, security relations between Europe and East Asia are increasingly based on industrial partnerships and shared supply chains.

Wirth and Saksar agree that such a strategic shift remains important even in the context of new diplomatic concepts, such as the idea of ​​“constructive strategic stability” between the United States and China.

Both German experts emphasize that such a global framework does not relieve European states of the obligation to strengthen their own capacities to act through a diversified and resilient base of resources and partnerships.