What can the Yemeni Houthis do and what do they want?

After a two-month hiatus, Yemen's Houthi militia has again attacked Israel. Their military spokesman, Yahya Sari, said on Monday (June 8) that missiles had been fired at Israel and at the same time announced a "complete blockade" of Israel's navigation in the Red Sea. All Israeli movements in that area will henceforth be considered military targets. According to Israeli data, an attempt to attack Israel from Yemen was also made on Tuesday. There appears to have been no major damage, as previous attacks have apparently been largely repelled.

This announcement coincided with renewed mutual attacks by Israel and Iran and should be understood as support for the Houthi-allied Iranian regime.

Both sides – Iran and Israel – declared the direct military confrontation over on Monday, at least for the time being.

Why are the Houthis returning to the scene in this particular situation?

For political scientist Abdulghani Al-Iriani from the Yemeni think tank "Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies" (SCSS), who lives in Jordan, the answer lies primarily in the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon - which Iran, among other things, has used to justify its recent military actions against Israel.

"The Israeli advance in Lebanon has caused such anger among the Yemeni population that the Houthis have been forced to react," he told DW in an interview. With these attacks, they have simultaneously fulfilled the expectations of their supporters, as well as Hezbollah and Iran, with whom they are allied.

Al-Irijani, however, does not expect the militia to re-enforce a major blockade of the Red Sea. Such a move would severely strain relations with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen is economically dependent on its northern neighbor.

"It would be almost suicidal to spoil those relations," Al-Irijani said. More likely would be limited action against ships that have a direct connection to Israel. "It is unlikely that the Houthis will do anything more."

"Internal legitimacy and external demonstration of power"

Christoph Leonhart, deputy CEO of the Berlin-based consultancy Middle East Minds and an expert on paramilitary groups, sees it somewhat differently. From the Huthi perspective, the rocket shelling is primarily a political-strategic signal.

"The shelling of Israel serves less a clearly defined operational objective and much more an internal legitimacy and external demonstration of power," Leonhart told DW.

However, a distinction must be made between direct attacks on Israeli territory and deterrence at sea. Even if the Houthis desist from further missile attacks, they could continue their activities in the Red Sea.

"Therefore, the Houthis will likely continue to carry out precisely targeted but effective operations, for example in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, while due to limited capacities, a direct escalation with Israel remains unlikely," analyzes Christoph Leonhart.

The Houthis remain dependent on support from Tehran. Iran supports the militia as part of its "Axis of Resistance," Leonhart says. Tehran provides weapons, training and strategic support, while the Houthis retain their operational independence, he says.

Experts have different views on the extent of the Houthis' real dependence on Iran.

"Serious military force"

Despite significant losses in recent years, the Houthis remain a serious military force, the International Crisis Group (ICG) recently assessed. The militia is “far from being a spent force.” Their actions serve both to support Iran and to secure their own political future.

The ICG also believes that the Houthis' attacks on Israel are partly motivated by domestic politics. Since the start of the Gaza war, they have increasingly positioned themselves as part of a regional alliance against Israel and the United States, bolstering their popularity and claim to regional prominence. At the same time, confronting an external enemy could divert attention from Yemen's ongoing economic problems, the ICG analysis said.

At the same time, their capabilities are limited. A prolonged conflict could deplete their stockpiles of missiles, drones and ammunition, the ICG analysis says. In addition, it is unclear to what extent Iran would be able to supply its allies in the future if it itself finds itself under even greater military pressure.

Regional ambitions for power

However, Leonhart believes that further action is conceivable. The Houthis are militarily dependent on Iran, but they pursue their own strategic goals and have regional ambitions for power. Even a stable ceasefire between Israel and Iran would not automatically deter them from further attacks, he believes.

The Houthis' real strength lies not so much in conventional warfare, but in their ability to inflict significant economic damage with drones, missiles, and attacks on trade routes. In particular, their militarily advantageous position and control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait give them strategic weight.

"Expanding Houthi maritime activities could further threaten the stability of global oil supplies and further raise energy prices," says Leonhart.

Risks after the Huta itself

However, larger attacks would also pose significant risks for the militia itself. Saudi journalist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed wrote on the X platform that Iran has now deployed its “third arm.” It could potentially threaten navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. While such a threat increases pressure on Iran’s opponents, it also increases the risk that counterattacks could destroy the Houthis’ remaining military capabilities.

Yemeni political scientist Abdulkarim Ganem makes a similar argument. He told Yemen Shabab TV that the Houthis are certainly capable of imposing a partial blockade of the strait. However, a complete blockade would be "strategic suicide for Tehran."