Controlling Iran's nuclear program – possible, but difficult

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was to resume inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. This was stipulated in the framework agreement between the United States and Iran.

Tehran, however, reiterated on Friday, July 10, after a Security Council meeting that it would not allow UN inspectors access to its nuclear facilities. The meeting, convened by Bahrain and European countries, came as renewed tensions between the US and Iran threaten to derail the framework agreement.

In a UN report presented at the meeting, the IAEA reported that it had “lost continuity of knowledge of all of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities” following last year’s 12-day war, as well as the conflict that Israel and the US launched on February 28.

Political obstacles

Technically, comprehensive control is in principle possible, experts believe. Politically, however, there are significant obstacles.

"Uranium enrichment takes place in large and easily visible industrial plants," radiochemist Georg Steinhauser from the Technical University of Vienna tells DW.

"It is unthinkable that someone would secretly build an atomic bomb in the basement and only show the inspectors the ground floor during a tour of the house."

According to him, uranium enrichment is a technically and industrially extremely demanding process that requires huge facilities and thousands of centrifuges. That is precisely why such a program can be effectively monitored.

Political scientist Hessam Habibi Doro from the Institute for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management (IFK) in Vienna also believes that the non-binding declaration of intentions between Iran and the US represents a step forward.

"The positive thing, above all, is that readiness for inspections and greater transparency have once again become a topic of discussion in Iran," he told DW.

However, he warns that there are serious political reservations. The law passed by the Iranian parliament significantly limits cooperation with the IAEA.

“There are currently very influential voices in parliament that oppose comprehensive inspections,” says Habibi Doro.

Highly enriched uranium

The International Atomic Energy Agency states that the main problem currently is not a lack of technical capabilities.

Since the US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, the IAEA has been unable to inspect any of the country's key uranium enrichment facilities. Monitoring currently relies largely on satellite imagery.

Therefore, the IAEA, as stated, cannot confirm whether Iran has stopped uranium enrichment, nor does it have information about the location of existing uranium stocks or how many centrifuges are still in operation.

According to the IAEA, Iran still has approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to about 60 percent. Experts believe that, after further enrichment to 90 percent, this amount of radioactive material could be enough to make several nuclear bombs.

Iran has consistently rejected claims that it wants to develop nuclear weapons and says its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only.

Will Iran allow full access?

For Steinhauser, the key issue is not the technical capabilities of surveillance, but access to the facilities.

"If Iran grants full access to its nuclear facilities, it can be determined with very high certainty whether a country is pursuing a civilian or military nuclear program," he says.

The concern arises from the possibility that some facilities may not be reported or that inspectors may not be allowed to inspect them.

Habibi Doro also believes that comprehensive control is possible in principle. However, this would require a return to an agreement with the US similar to the one from 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

That agreement, brokered by European states, gave the IAEA broad inspection powers and was long considered the most comprehensive system of oversight of a national nuclear program in the world.

US President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA during his first term, in May 2018.

"If comparable control mechanisms and oversight instruments were reintroduced, comprehensive control would be possible in principle," says Habibi Doro.

It remains an open question whether the political leadership in Tehran would be willing to make such concessions today. There is an increasingly open debate within parts of the political and security establishment about whether Iran, after recent and now renewed military conflicts, should expand rather than limit its nuclear options.

Control "virtually lost"

The Institute for Science and International Security in Washington has reached similar conclusions.

The authors of one of the leading current analyses confirm that the IAEA has "virtually lost control over the Iranian nuclear program."

The agency, according to their assessment, can no longer reliably verify the extent of Iran's uranium stockpiles, their location, or the condition of Iran's uranium enrichment facilities.

At the same time, experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warn that Iran's technical capabilities should not be underestimated after the attack.

Although large parts of the known infrastructure have been damaged, later reconstruction or even relocation of certain activities to smaller and more concealed facilities cannot be ruled out, it is stated.

"An industrial uranium enrichment plant is very difficult to hide," says Georg Steinhauser.

Such facilities are large, technically complex and inevitably leave traces that can be detected by inspectors on the ground. This is true even if there is an attempt to conceal parts of the program, he noted.

Whether the international community will be able to follow those traces again in the future will therefore depend less on the inspectors' abilities and more on the cessation of the latest conflicts, and then on Iran's political willingness to actually allow them to monitor.