Each of the Yugoslav republics - later states - was exceptional in some way in their identity politics, although they all had a similar fate in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which lasted from 1990 to 2008, although some still believe that this disintegration may still not completely finished. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a process that also meant the disintegration of some of its republics, also on ethno-political and identity grounds. Croatia also fell apart (with the separation of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina), Bosnia and Herzegovina (into several parts, which included the self-proclaimed independence of the Republika Srpska, and flirting with the de facto independence of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, as well as Fikret Abdić's Western Bosnia), and Serbia, from which Kosovo (and Metohija) separated.
Two of those three republics, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were later (1995) reintegrated, mostly with the help and consent of the United States of America. Serbia, which did not have that consent and help, has remained disintegrated to this day - at least that's how she sees it herself. It is the same with the de facto disintegration of Kosovo itself, whose northern part with the Serbian majority remains only partially integrated into Kosovo, and whose fate is still uncertain, given Kosovo's refusal to accept the Union of Serbian Municipalities.
In that process, some republics stood out for their exceptionality. The term "exceptionalism" or "exceptionalism" is used in the political science literature primarily in connection with the USA, whose "exceptionalism" is of a different character and refers to the American idea that America is not an ordinary country like all the others, but a global superpower that simultaneously "protects" and promotes the so-called universal values, and therefore reserves the right to intervene where these "universal values" are allegedly threatened. America sees its interventions elsewhere in the world neither as its own imperialism nor as nationalism, but as an expression of its exceptional responsibility and special "right" to protect the "free world". She presents her interventions, when they happen, from that vision. Practically, it behaves according to the principle "Quod licet Iovi non licet bovi", considering that the main characteristic of a superpower is that it can decide for itself what should be ignored and what should not be ignored, i.e. when to intervene and when not to intervene in international issues.
The exceptionality in the former Yugoslavia refers, for example, to the position of (today's North) Macedonia, which is the only one of the Yugoslav republics that did not participate in wars, nor was it seriously affected by them, regardless of the incidents of medium intensity that it went through in 2001. Serbia considered that it was an exception in Yugoslavia because it was the only one with provinces. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one without an ethnic majority and the only one constituted by three "constituent nations", which received their internationally recognized status in Dayton in 1995. BiH is an exception also in that it is the only one with a constitution that was not written in the the country, but outside it.
Retrospectively, it can be said that in 1992, Montenegro made the breakup of Yugoslavia complicated. If she then decided to follow the path of independence, as she indicated at one point that she might want to (at the London conference in September 1991), but after only a few days she withdrew and changed her decision, Serbia would then also become independent, because it would not had someone to form a new (reduced) Yugoslavia with. This would mean that Kosovo would undoubtedly remain part of Serbia then
Montenegro is an exception due to several identity and political features that distinguish it from the others. It is the only Yugoslav republic in which the League of Communists, under that name, won the first multi-party elections in December 1990. Except for it, in all other republics the former only party changed its name before the elections. Afterwards, Montenegro was the only one of the Yugoslav republics to decide in a referendum (in March 1992) that it did not want independence but wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, together with Serbia. That decision was later annulled by another referendum, the one from May 2006, when 55,5 percent of Montenegrin citizens voted for independence, thus making Serbia - which has never had a referendum on independence (the only one of all Yugoslav republics) - practically independent.
Retrospectively, it can be said that in 1992, Montenegro made the breakup of Yugoslavia complicated. If she then decided to follow the path of independence, as she indicated at one point that she might want to (at the London conference in September 1991), but after only a few days she withdrew and changed her decision, Serbia would then also become independent, because it would not had someone to form a new (reduced) Yugoslavia with. Maybe then she would have decided to put more pressure on another republic, say Macedonia, or she would have recognized the Republic of Srpska or the then still existing Republic of Srpska Krajina. Or she would simply accept her independence within the limits of Avnoy. That last solution, however, would mean that Kosovo, whose request for independence was unanimously rejected not only by the decisions of the Badinter Commission, but also by the policies of all the other Yugoslav republics, would undoubtedly remain part of Serbia.
Croatia and Slovenia, which in 1990 proposed the confederation of Yugoslavia in a joint proposal that Slovenia quickly abandoned, believed that Yugoslavia should be turned into a confederation of six rather than eight states. Thus, they were ready to recognize statehood only to the republics and not to the provinces, which is why a large number of Kosovo intellectuals accused the political leaders of those two republics of "stabbing them in the back". Today, Croatia and Slovenia are reluctant to remember that episode, especially since they still recognized Kosovo in 2008. At the same time, Croatia directly questioned its own agreement on the normalization of relations with FR Yugoslavia, which it signed in 1996 and which is based on the idea of recognizing the borders as they were then.
Although Montenegro was still in a federative relationship with Serbia within the FR Yugoslavia, it increasingly behaved as an independent state. She had Western support for that, and her move away from Milosevic was used to put pressure on him. In that period, Montenegro became a refuge for opposition politicians from Serbia - e.g. Zoran Đinđić and Vuk Drašković. At that time, it was indeed far more progressive than Serbia, and it further increased its democratic credibility. Milo Đukanović was therefore seen as an advocate of democracy and a Western ally
Montenegro began its journey towards independence in 1997 when Milo Đukanović defeated Momir Bulatović, which caused the split of their joint DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists, as the SC of Montenegro was renamed in 1991) into two parties: DPS and Socialist People's Party ( SNP). Đukanović's radical change of course was the result of his correct assessment that the West would put enormous pressure on Slobodan Milošević - not so much (or at least: not only) because of what he did from 1991 to 1995, but because of what he did in 1996, when decided not to accept the results of the local elections, thus showing himself to be an autocrat. This led to the beginning of mass protests in Serbia (primarily in Belgrade), which in the next few years led to its demolition, the end of which was October 5 (2000). Although Montenegro was still in a federative relationship with Serbia within the FR Yugoslavia, it increasingly behaved as an independent state. She had Western support for that, and her move away from Milosevic was used to put pressure on him. In that period, Montenegro became a refuge for opposition politicians from Serbia - e.g. Zoran Đinđić and Vuk Drašković. At that time, it was indeed far more progressive than Serbia, and it further increased its democratic credibility. Milo Đukanović was therefore seen as an advocate of democracy and a Western ally.
Two years after this turn, in 1999, Montenegro introduced the German mark as a parallel currency, which would not have been possible without the consent of the West, which was then strongly influenced by liberal interventionists, especially after Tony Blair became British Prime Minister in 1997. Liberals believe that wars are the result of autocratic and dictatorial regimes, and that democracy - especially liberal democracy - is a necessary condition for peace. The support they gave to the Kosovo separatists already in 1998 - in another complete reversal from the previous policy - was also a consequence of the desire to topple the (""dictator")" Milošević. In this sense, today's assessments that the bombing of FR Yugoslavia (primarily Serbia, while Montenegro was largely spared) were not because of Milosevic but because of Kosovo itself are not correct. Kosovo was a collateral beneficiary of the assessment that Milosevic did not want a democratic Serbia.
Later, in 2003, when Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated, the West once again supported Montenegro and Kosovo, considering that the democratic forces in Serbia were too weak to establish a lasting democracy. They (pre)saw that the forces that dominated Serbian politics in the 2006s would strengthen and return to power. That murder gave the Montenegrin sovereignists, as well as the Kosovo ones, an ("argument") - that the deep state in Serbia is still ruled by forces that oppose cooperation with the West as well as any democratization of Serbia itself. This was used to support the path to independence of both of these entities, which actually declared independence a few years later: Montenegro in 2008 and Kosovo in 2012. From the subsequent development of events, which led to the return to power of socialists and former radicals in the XNUMX elections, it can be said that such an assessment was not without basis. Western support for the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo is, therefore, at least partially, a consequence of internal political trends in Serbia itself, or - to be more precise - the perception of those trends in the West.
Montenegro is also an exception in terms of identity issues that are characteristic of that country and did not occur in other countries. It is the only country that, from 1991 to 2003, lost the ethnic majority of its largest nation, in this case the Montenegrins. In the 1991 census, they made up 62 percent of the population, while only nine percent declared themselves as Serbs. This changed significantly in the next census, in 2003, when Montenegrins were less than half, 43 percent, and Serbs 32 percent. Similar results were confirmed in the 2011 census, when there were 45 percent of Montenegrins and 29 percent of Serbs. This meant that around 20 percent of Montenegrins changed their national self-determination in the meantime, becoming Serbs. Thus, Montenegrins in Montenegro became a minority in relation to the total population, although they were still the largest nation. That trend made Montenegro - in the ethnic sense - the "new Bosnia and Herzegovina", which was the only country in Yugoslavia without an ethnic majority of any of its constituent peoples. To make the difference even greater, Bosnia and Herzegovina has since ceased to be so, as the 2013 census showed that Bosniaks crossed the threshold of 50 percent, albeit only by 0,1 percent. Thus, Montenegro remained the only country in the post-Yugoslav area that does not have an ethnic majority.
The flexibility, i.e. changeability, of national self-identification in Montenegro calls into question the thesis of all nationalists in the world - that nations are permanent and unchanging categories, as well as that they are stable and have always existed
Such flexibility, i.e. changeability, of national self-identification in Montenegro calls into question the thesis of all nationalists in the world - that nations are permanent and unchanging categories, as well as that they are stable and have existed forever. National sentiment is changeable, although nowhere else in the post-Yugoslav area is it so changeable as in the case of Montenegro. In that country, ethnic differences are often present even within the same family, and apparently there are many people who change their nationality during their lifetime.
What followed after the independence of Montenegro is in many respects a typical process in which the state acts as a nation-builder, trying to consolidate, shape and partially impose - through state actions - the national identity of the majority. Nations sometimes create states, but also states, especially new ones, create nations. In this process, states interested in nation-building seek to consolidate both aspects of the nation's identity. One refers to achieving the greatest possible homogeneity of the collective "we", and the other to strengthening the border between the collective "we" and the collective "they". That "they" refers to "others", who should be visibly different. If they are not, they should be made so. Therefore, Montenegro started to create and strengthen Montenegrin nationalism, which declared Serbs, Yugoslavs and all others as "other". Although it declared itself a "civil state" and the Montenegrin constitution was written on that basis, Montenegro is in fact a highly ethnicized country, which considers it its duty to consolidate the Montenegrin identity, which is built around the idea of Montenegrinism. National and "citizen" are so intertwined and connected in this case, that in the English language there are no two terms for these two categories, as, say, there is between "Serb" and "Serbian" or "Croat" and "Croatian". There is only one term that simultaneously covers citizens of Montenegro and Montenegrins as a people.
Interventions were made in all three elements that can serve to create diversity where there was none before or where it was small and marginal. The first element is language. In Montenegro, from Serbo-Croatian, it first became "maternal" and then called itself Montenegrin. For this purpose, the state established a special faculty for Montenegrin language and literature (originally an Institute from 2010, and from 2014 a faculty), and encouraged the creation of Montenegrin orthography. With the help of Croatian linguists, the new Montenegrin language also promoted two new letters, soft š and soft ž (ś and ź), which do not exist in Serbo-Croatian, which split into Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian/Bosnian and Montenegrin. In the linguistic sense - as shown by Snježana Kordić in her extremely good book "Language and Nationalism" (2010) - it is a polycentric language, like many others, e.g. English, French and German. But political interest (or "state reason") led to the claim that these are different languages, connected to national identity. The thesis appeared that every nation has the right to its own language. That opened the question - what language do Bosniaks, Muslims and Serbs speak in Montenegro itself? Do they also have the right to call their language by their national name - or does that right belong only to a state that clearly favors one nation over others.
Another important element of national identity in which the Montenegrin state decided to intervene was the question of the interpretation of the past. Like other post-Yugoslav states, Montenegro also began to interpret its past in an anti-Yugoslav way. The Assembly of Montenegro annulled the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly from 1918 and now treated that act as an act of "occupation" by Serbia. However, it also called into question the creation of the common Yugoslav state, which was created in a parallel and simultaneous process with the unification of Montenegro and Serbia. And indeed, although it existed as a state and was internationally recognized since 1878, Montenegro disappeared from the name of the new country, which was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Serbia never succeeded in turning Montenegrins into Serbs, and resistance to that attempt increased the popularity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Montenegro itself. Among other things, this is also why socialist Yugoslavia offered Montenegrins - who were extremely divided on the issue of relations with Serbia as early as 1918 - a compromise, because it restored both Montenegro and Serbia as national states, republics within Yugoslavia. Thus, they were both united and separated from each other. These remained within the FR Yugoslavia, that is, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003). Now all those previous decisions - the one from 1918, the one from 1945, and the one from 1992 - have been declared wrong, and thus the whole idea of Yugoslavia in any of its forms has been disavowed. In the meantime, anti-Yugoslavism has become an important element in the construction of new, post-Yugoslav identities for everyone - including Serbia - although it was significantly constitutive of the national and state identities of all the countries that exist on its soil today. The borders of Montenegro, the republican character of the state government, as well as the national character of the Montenegrins, are all achievements of the 20th century, to which the current Montenegro refers, "forgetting" the sources of those achievements. The post-Yugoslav states, through their nationalisms, act patricidally, "killing" the father in order to become the absolute owners of their own identity.
Joining NATO also had an unfavorable effect on the credibility of the old narrative, promoted for a long time by DPS, which indicated that Montenegro was in great danger from Serbs and Russians. Today, it is much more difficult than it was before 2017, and especially before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to believe in the need for the security of Montenegro to depend only on the continuation of the government of the same party and the same man. This can also be found in - perhaps the most important - reasons for Milo Đukanović's decline in popularity and his defeat in the presidential elections
The third element important for national identity is religion, that is, the church. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church became the main institution connecting Serbs in the countries of the region, who previously lived in the same state and are now divided into several. Like the Catholic Church (which in Croatia has long been called the "Catholic Church of the Croats", which gives it a national dimension), the SPC had and continues to have a social and political role, which focused on strengthening and consolidating Serbian national identity after of Yugoslavia. Montenegrin nationalism therefore considered it the main obstacle in the consolidation of the Montenegrin identity, which would be separate from and opposed to the Serbian one. The term "Church of Serbia" first appeared in Montenegro, in order to separate it from Montenegro and the Serbs in it, and then the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church began to be preferred. This happens even though the SPC itself says that it is a multinational church, even though it really acts as a representative and organization of Serbs in Serbia and outside of it. She herself saw the legal regulation of the SPC's status as an attack on its existence, which caused organized mass protests (litias), which also had a nationalist - and not only a religious - character.
Just before the 2020 elections, both Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism escalated, so it seemed that the situation was more dangerous than ever before. It should also be said that the completely inappropriate appearance of the phrase "Serbian world" in the discourse coming from Serbia, as well as various fantasies about "two Serbian states" and the like, which could not produce any positive effect for calming and improving relations between the two countries, contributed to this. countries. At the same time, Montenegrin nationalism also showed its paradoxes. At one point, he claimed that the new SPC Metropolitan Joaniki could be enthroned in any other city except Cetinje. When - in order to prevent Patriarch Porphyry from enthroning Ioanniki in Cetinje - they set up barricades on the approaches to that city, they actually in some way implemented the Montenegrin form of the "log revolution", so it looked as if they wanted to practically separate Cetinje from the rest of Montenegro, declaring it some special place where the laws do not apply the same as in other places. What, by the way, should the idea mean that the enthronement can be done anywhere else, just not in Cetinje?
Consolidation of the new Montenegrin identity has been taking place since 2006 in other matters, such as the colors of the flag and the words of the anthem. The flag is a particularly interesting case. In the era of socialist Yugoslavia, it was the same as the flag of the SR Serbia - tricolor: red-blue-white with a star in the middle. Only Montenegro and Serbia in Yugoslavia had the same flag. This showed a special relationship in that identity couple, a relationship that Slobodan Milošević later compared to "two eyes in a head". But, after independence, Montenegro decided to abandon the tricolor and introduced a red-yellow flag, very different from the Serbian one. Since then, the tricolor has appeared as a form of resistance and protest in relation to Montenegrin nationalism (which its critics, especially those coming from the Serbian nationalist discourse, sometimes call "Montenegrinism") and the idea of secession. Some tricolors that appear for this purpose are indeed the flags of current Serbia, but there are more that use traditional Montenegrin heraldic elements (blue and not blue, Montenegrin "silver" coat of arms, etc.) and therefore it is wrong to treat them as the same flags of other countries. country, Serbia. It is paradoxical, however, that both Montenegro and Serbia included the crown in their coats of arms, although both are republics. It is even more strange, however, and anti-historical considering its own history of political ideas, that Croatia also has a crown (admittedly somewhat stylized) in its coat of arms and on its flag. Most people don't notice or question it, just like they don't analyze the words of the national anthem. Ritualization and symbolization, as a rule, hinders the search for meaning and rational explanation.
Montenegro is an exception in another element related to inter-ethnic relations. It is about the fact that the two largest nations - Montenegrins and Serbs - are in a rather unregulated field, without any special agreement on mutual relations and status, whether domestic or international. In addition, nationalists on both sides actually somehow question the existence of the other nation. Radical Serbian nationalists believe that Montenegrins are a regional and not a national community, while Montenegrin nationalists believe that Serbs are some kind of political and not ethnic category, almost only a protest community of those Montenegrins who did not accept the independence of Montenegro and who want reunification with Serbia. And indeed, the number of Serbs increased significantly after the turnaround carried out by Milo Đukanović from 1997 onwards - in fact, it tripled. However, denying the ethnic character of Serbs and reducing them to "outlaws" and political opposition, which results in the refusal to talk about the status of Serbs in Montenegro, causes serious problems, and represents a paradox in relation to the main idea of Montenegrin nationalism: that it is about two different, separate, and even mutually hostile, communities.
Today, Serbs in Montenegro are neither a "constituent nation" nor a "minority", although in terms of percentage in relation to the entire population, they are larger than some recognized "constituent nations" (e.g. Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and larger than all minorities in post-Yugoslav countries . Albanians in North Macedonia, for example, make up 24 percent of the entire population, and even at the time when Kosovo was undoubtedly in Serbia, the number of Albanians in Serbia did not exceed 20 percent of the population. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Macedonia and even in Croatia, where today all minorities together make up less than five percent of the population, these less numerous communities are recognized as minorities or as constitutive nations, or as smaller communities, in order to avoid political problematic concepts.
Their status in all three countries is regulated by constitutions and international agreements, such as Ohrid (in North Macedonia), Erdut (in Croatia) and Dayton (in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Nothing similar exists in Montenegro, perhaps because neither of the two nations wants to internationalize the national issue, and perhaps also because Serbs and Montenegrins had a "velvet divorce", without any violence or problems. In fact, the disintegration of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro - along with the separation of the then FR Yugoslavia from the then Macedonia - was a very positive example that independence can be achieved without conflict, with the consent of both parties.
In the last 30 years, Serbs could be objected to - mostly with reason - but not that they tried to prevent the independence of Montenegro. In that country, the Serbs there even accepted that a key decision for its future - such as the referendum on independence - was organized according to the principle of "one man - one voice", and not according to the principle of consensus of the two largest national communities. This was not accepted by the Serbs (that is, a significant part of them, since there was an intra-ethnic division on this issue) neither in Croatia nor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Albanians in North Macedonia, who boycotted the referendum on independence, considered that the outcome therefore imposed, although they later tacitly accepted it, demanding, however, additional compensation. They got it through the practical transformation of North Macedonia into a co-national state, through the Ohrid Agreement from 2001.
The two largest nations – Montenegrins and Serbs – are in a rather unregulated field, without any particular agreement on mutual relations and status, either domestic or international. In addition, nationalists on both sides actually somehow question the existence of the other nation
Last, but not least, Montenegro is an exception in that the only government in it by one party – the Democratic Party of Socialists – lasted without interruption from the beginning of the nineties until 2020, i.e. a full 30 years. When you add to that the previous government of the Union of Communists of Montenegro, we are talking about 75 years of continuity, which is unprecedented in post-Yugoslav countries. We cannot go into the reasons for such a long reign of one party in this article. We can only state that first in August 2020 and then in April 2023, when Milo Đukanović lost the presidential elections, a long era ended that left an indelible mark on Montenegrin history, as well as on the history of Serbian-Montenegrin relations. The tensions created by that government, especially from 1997 to 2022, did not escalate into an open conflict between Serbs and Montenegrins. The main reason for this should also be sought in the history of their mutual relations.
That history, fortunately, does not include any internecine war, and thus no greater possibility to manipulate the memories and policies of history in order to generate a new conflict. Namely, previous wars last in the memory of the following generations, so it is easier to start new wars among those who have already fought than among those who do not have such traumatic experiences in mutual relations. This distinguishes, for example, the relations between Serbs on the one hand and Croats and Bosniaks on the other - nations that found themselves on different sides in the First and partly also in the Second World War - from the relations not only between Serbs and Montenegrins, and Serbs and Macedonians, but even between Albanians and Serbs, who, despite all the tensions and differences, did not go to war with each other in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, as these three nations did in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Montenegrin exceptionalism is not, therefore, of the same character as American exceptionalism. Montenegro is the smallest post-Yugoslav state, not a global superpower. However, the trends of the creation of the nation after the creation of the state indicate similar processes in many of them. When Montenegro joined NATO (2017), then US President Donald Trump expressed his dilemma about the opportunity of such an expansion, saying that a third world war could break out around Montenegro, since the Russian influence in it was great, implying that it is a potentially unstable small state that NATO will have to defend, perhaps against Russia.
In the meantime, Russia started a war in Ukraine, and they, like the USA, consider today that Montenegro - like every country that is a member of NATO - is part of the West. That is why the pressure on Montenegro itself decreased, since Russia also saw that further possible interference in Montenegrin affairs would lead to a confrontation with the West. But joining NATO also had an unfavorable effect on the credibility of the old narrative, promoted for a long time by DPS, which indicated that Montenegro was in great danger from the Serbs and Russians. Today, it is much more difficult than it was before 2017, and especially before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to believe in the need for the security of Montenegro to depend only on the continuation of the government of the same party and the same man. In this can be found the - perhaps most important - reasons for the decline in popularity of Milo Đukanović, and his defeat in the presidential elections in 2023.
Bonus video:
